補充實驗數據作為進步性之答辯。

補充實驗數據作為進步性之答辯。

此外， 申請時說明書、申請專利範圍或圖式已明確揭露發明的結構、操作及功能等技術內容，雖未提及或未充分提及功效， 若能經由該發明所屬技術領域中具有通常知識者自該結構、操作及功能直接且無歧異得知者，該功效之闡明亦不構成新事項。

【審查基準，2021 年版，2 - 6 - 6。】

進步性的答辯時，新內容會不會構成新事項？

於進步性的答辯時，在意見陳述書中增加實驗數據、或新的描述，顯示發明之功效，不會構成New Matter。

此外，為了舉證發明的功效，還能夠向美國專利局提出「暫緩審查程序 Suspension of Action」，以“暫時地”停止審查以爭取時間，例如要追加實驗，取得証明本發明的優越性的資料。

「暫緩審查程序 Suspension of Action」
http://patentdic.blogspot.com/search?q=%E5%AF%A6%E9%A9%97+%E5%BB%B6%E9%95%B7

日本去年七月的判例。
http://www.hanketsu.jiii.or.jp/hanketsu/jsp/hatumeisi/news/201104news.pdf

解決課題及び解決手段が提示されているか否かは、『発明の効果』がどのようなものであるかと不即不離の関係があるといえる。そのような点を考慮すると、本願当初明細書において明らかにしていなかった『発明の効果』について、進歩性の判断において、出願の後に補充した実験結果等を参酌することは、出願人と第三者との公平を害する結果を招来するので、特段の事情のない限り許されないというべきである。

他方、進歩性の判断において、『発明の効果』を出願の後に補充した実験結果等を考慮することが許されないのは、上記の特許制度の趣旨、出願人と第三者との公平等の要請に基づくものであるから、当初明細書に、『発明の効果』に関し、何らの記載がない場合はさておき、当業者において『発明の効果』を認識できる程度の記載がある場合やこれを推論できる記載がある場合には、記載の範囲を超えない限り、出願の後に補充した実験結果等を参酌することは許されるというべきであり、許されるか否かは、前記公平の観点に立って判断すべきである。」

MPEP
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/0700_716_02_f.htm#sect716.02f
716.02(f) Advantages Disclosed or Inherent

The totality of the record must be considered when determining whether a claimed invention would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made. Therefore, evidence and arguments directed to advantages not disclosed in the specification cannot be disregarded. In re Chu, 66 F.3d 292, 298-99, 36 USPQ2d 1089, 1094-95 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Although the purported advantage of placement of a selective catalytic reduction catalyst in the bag retainer of an apparatus for controlling emissions was not disclosed in the specification, evidence and arguments rebutting the conclusion that such placement was a matter of "design choice" should have been considered as part of the totality of the record. "We have found no cases supporting the position that a patent applicant's evidence or arguments traversing a § 103 rejection must be contained within the specification. There is no logical support for such a proposition as well, given that obviousness is determined by the totality of the record including, in some instances most significantly, the evidence and arguments proffered during the give-and-take of ex parte patent prosecution." 66 F.3d at 299, 36 USPQ2d at 1095.). See also In re Zenitz, 333 F.2d 924, 928, 142 USPQ 158, 161 (CCPA 1964) (evidence that claimed compound minimized side effects of hypotensive activity must be considered because this undisclosed property would inherently flow from disclosed use as tranquilizer); Ex parte Sasajima, 212 USPQ 103, 104 - 05 (Bd. App. 1981) (evidence relating to initially undisclosed relative toxicity of claimed pharmaceutical compound must be considered).

The specification need not disclose proportions or values as critical for applicants to present evidence showing the proportions or values to be critical. In re Saunders, 444 F.2d 599, 607, 170 USPQ 213, 220 (CCPA 1971).

小小的改善，亦具有進步性。

在一個高度發展的技術領域，一個小小的改善，亦具有進步性。

http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/jom/matters/matters-9609.html
Crowded Art: This refers to an area of technology in which there have been a large number of prior inventions. In a crowded art, it takes less of an advancement to obtain a valid patent. Otherwise, one would have to conclude that there can be no further patenting in that art.

http://www.dallasbar.com/members/headnotes_showarticle.asp?article_id=1447&issue_id=131
For example, in Gemtron Corp. v. Saint-Gobain Corp., the District Court for the Western District of Michigan denied summary judgment and found that “KSR does not automatically call for a ruling of invalidity unless the patent challenged is a major development in the art” because even “narrow improvements in a crowded art” continue to be patentable.

進步性判決

The fallacy of this reasoning is that no one of the references suggests such a substitution, quite apart from the result which would be obtained thereby. Such piecemeal reconstruction of the prior art patents in the light of appellant's disclosure is contrary to the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 103.

The ever present question in cases within the ambit of 35 U.S.C. § 103 is whether the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art following the teachings of the prior art at the time the invention was made.

It is impermissible within the framework of section 103 to pick and choose from any one reference only so much of it as will support a given position, to the exclusion of other parts necessary to the full appreciation of what such reference fairly suggests to one of ordinary skill in the art.
從任一參考文獻中，挑出或選擇僅僅某一部分，單只因為此部分能支持某一特定立場，而排除讓熟悉此領域技藝者從此參考文獻之教示所能合理完整理解的其他重要的部分，這是在103段落的架構下所不容許的。

臺灣與美國的專利制度不同處之一

l   結論

 

臺灣的制度與美國的制度不同，在臺灣的專利實務中，不能夠用「先申請後公開」的前案當作進步性的拒絕理由，但在美國可以用「先申請後公開」的前案當作進步性的理由。此外，請留意103(c)另規定有但書，如果「先申請後公開」的前案與本發明申請案的擁有人相同時，則就不能夠用「先申請後公開」的前案當作進步性的拒絕理由。

 

l   關於法條的規定，請參考103(a)的條文

 

(a)  A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negative by the manner in which the invention was made.

 

法條中使用“in section 102”的用語，表示其包含102(e)的情況。可以再參考MPEP 2141.01 中的記載「A 35 U.S.C. 103 rejection is based on 35 U.S.C. 102(a), 102(b), 102(e), etc. depending on the type of prior art reference used and its publication or issue date.」。

 

l   關於法條的規定，請參考103(c)的條文

(c)(1) Subject matter developed by another person, which qualifies as prior art only under one or more of subsections (e), (f), and (g) of section 102 of this title, shall not preclude patentability under this section where the subject matter and the claimed invention were, at the time the claimed invention was made, owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person.

 

因此，依據103(c)的規定，於發明當時適用102(e)的前案（亦即「先申請後公開」的前案）與本案被同一人所擁有時，102(e)的前案不能夠當作進步性的拒絕理由。

 

l   假設所引用的前案及本案的申請日優先權日如下

 

前案	專利號或公開號	公開日	申請日	發明人
A		12-2008	Jun 21, 2004
B		01-2006	Jun 29, 2005

 

本案	專利申請號	優先日	申請日	發明人
C		2005/7/7	2006/7/7

 

由於本案的優先權日晚於前案A及B的申請日，因此依據103(a)的規定，能夠用依據102(e)的前案來核駁本案的進步性。此外，由於前案與本案的擁有人不相同，不符合103(c)的例外條件。因此，我方認為審查員所引用的前案是適格的前案。

 

l   美國最高法院的判例

 

關於此問題，還可以參考美國最高法院的判例「Hazeltine Research, Inc.  v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252, 147 USPQ 429 (1965)」，請參閱附件。其中記載：

The Commissioner, relying chiefly on Alexander Milburn Co.  v. Davis-Bournonville Co.,  270 U.S.  390, contends that when a patent is issued, the disclosures contained in the patent become a part of the prior art as of the time the application was filed, not, as petitioners contend, at the time the patent is issued. In that case a patent was held invalid because, at the time it was applied for, there was already pending an application which completely and adequately described the invention.  In holding that  the issuance of a patent  based  on  the  first   application  barred  the  valid  issuance  of  a  patent  based  on  the  second application, Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, said, "The delays of the Patent Office ought not to cut down the effect of what has been done. . . . [The first applicant] had taken steps that would make it public as soon as the Patent Office did its work, although, of course, amendments might be required of him before the end could be reached.  We see no reason in the words or policy of the law for  allowing [the second applicant] to profit by the delay . . . ." At p. 401.

 

大法官認為，說明書所揭示內容，變成前案的效力是發生於申請當時而不是公開時間點，智財局延遲公開申請案的內容，不應影響已完成的動作，且沒有好的理由讓第二個申請人受益於智財局因行政作業所造成的公開延遲。

 

關於102(e)拒絕理由的答辯方向

關於102(e)拒絕理由的答辯方向

美國智財局內部的訓練教材。
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/mpep_examguide.html

其中有一項關於102(e)的訓練教材
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2003/week02/patguid.htm


IV) Examination Procedures under 35 U.S.C. 102(e) and 374
(1) Determine the effective filing date(s) of the application being examined.
(2) Determine and perform an appropriate prior art search.
(3) Determine if the potential reference under 102(e) is "by another."
(4) Determine the appropriate 102(e) date for each potential reference by following the guidelines below and examples set forth under Part V:
(5) Determine whether 35 U.S.C. 103(c) common assignee considerations apply.

If a 102(e) reference is applied in an obviousness rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) (including provisional rejections) in an application filed on or after November 29, 1999 iv, the examiner should ascertain whether there is evidence that the claimed invention and the reference were owned by the same person, or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person, at the time the claimed invention was made. A clear statement of entitlement to the prior art exclusion by applicant(s) or a registered practitioner would be sufficient evidence to establish the prior art exclusion. A double patenting rejection, however, based on the 102(e) reference could be applied, if appropriate, even if the reference is disqualified from being used a rejection under 103(a). See MPEP 706.02(l), Eighth Edition (Aug. 2001).

如上所述，克服102(e)前案的作法整理如下四種：
(1)：103(a)規定只有在“by another”的情況下才能當作引證案，所以可以依37CFR1.132，請每位發明人提宣誓書，宣誓前案及後案的發明不是“by another”。
(2)：因美國係以發明日進行審查，因此可以提後案的發明日早於前案的證據。
(3)依37CFR1.130宣誓申請人相同，並提terminal disclaimer。
(4)因103(C)有規定不適合當作前案的一些例外，若符合“the subject matter and the claimed invention were, at the time the claimed invention was made, owned by the same person”的前案，即可直接以103(C)說明，前案為不適合的引證案。

以第4種方法答辯，對公司取得權利後的影響最小，建議以第4種方式答辯，但必須修正請求項範圍，讓前案和後案的範圍不要完全相同，藉以克服102(e)，隨後可能會再次遇到以先前的適用102(e)的前案及103(a)的拒絕理由，因此必須再依103(c)排除102(e)的前案。

進步性的答辯方向（二）

進步性的答辯方向（二）

此連結（the patent prospector）中亦列出了將來能夠用來進行進步性答辯的方向。

1、請求項源自不可預期的效果。當指出先前技藝方式無法產生相似的效果時，這是最佳的使用時機。

2、先前技藝所使用之被展現的特性，相異於所請求之發明所達成的特性。此可視為不可預期之效果的變化。

3、所舉出之先前技藝，對所請求之發明提供相反教示。當先前技術所採用之技術方向，係達成相異的結果；使用相異的手段或相異的程序時，這是最佳的使用時機。

4、所舉出之先前技藝的組合，產生相異的效果，因此不會產生所請求的發明。

5、當證據顯示，所舉出之先前技藝的組合係以某種方式相異於所請求的發明時，可以爭論，所請求的發明並非一種組合。

6、審查員適用了後見之明的偏見，因為所請求之發明其所欲解決的問題，係利用先前技術以相異的文脈來看待，並且從該（先前技術的）文脈來看，此解決方案不會被視為顯而易知的。替代地（Alternately），於先前技藝的架構中，所述之組合不會被認為是一種合理可預想的成功組合。當相反教示的爭論不能被證實時，這比較是一種微妙的變化型。

7、組合是源自相差很大的技術領域，而先前技藝的應用實質上相異於所請求發明，因此，此組合僅能由後見之明所思及。

8、所舉出之先前技藝係組合不同的程序，此些程序發生於不同的文脈，使用不同的機制，處於不同的階段，及/或具有不同的效果。

9、所請求之元件其一的功能相異於所舉出之先前技藝。

10、於先前技藝具有無限的組合可能，且一種特殊的，先前未被知道的洞察結果，導出所請求的發明。

11、審查員並未提供理由或分析為何參考文獻會被組合。唉，這對審查員是一種愚弄，他會以捏造的理由反擊，而攻擊這不切實際的理由希望渺茫，不過，承受所有你能承受的打擊。

12、所組合的參考文獻未教示請求項所有的限制條件。

13、所提案之組合或修改，會破壞參考文獻的功能，或使其無法滿足它的使用目的（參考MPEP 2143.01）。

14、所請求之範圍的重要性；加上產生該效果的證據（參考MPEP 2144.05）。

15、二次考量，如商業的成功（祝好運）、滿足長期的需求、其他人的失敗、被其他人複製。

16、不將參考文獻加以組合係為常識，因此所請求之發明非顯而易知。換言之，將參考文獻加以組合為非常識。有一點像在反駁整體的置換可能性。

==========

From that flow possible arguments to counter obviousness. There are but a few primary thrusts, with variations that apply to different claimed subject matter.

1) The claims derive from unpredictable results. Best used when pointing out how the prior art approach failed to yield similar results.

2) The prior art use exhibited different properties than that achieved by the claimed invention; a variation of unpredictable results.

3) The cited prior art teaches away from the claimed invention. Best used when the prior art takes a vector that achieves different results, uses different means or different process.

4) The cited prior art combination yielded different results, so would not yield the claimed invention. 

5) The claimed invention is not a combination, as evidence by the cited combination prior art being different in some way from the claimed invention.

6) Hindsight bias was applied by the examiner because the problem solved by the claimed invention was viewed in a different context by the cited prior art; from that (prior art) context, the solution would thus not have been obvious. Alternately, in the framework of prior art application, the cited combination would not have been considered to have a reasonable expectation of success. This a more subtle variant when the teaching away argument cannot be substantiated.

7) The combination results from such disparate technology arts, where prior art application was substantially different than claimed, that the combination could only be conceived in hindsight.

8) The cited prior art combines different processes occurring in different contexts, using different mechanisms, at different stages, and/or with different results.

9) One of the claimed elements functions differently than in the cited prior art.

10) There were an infinite number of combinations possible in the prior art, and a particular previously unrealized insight led to the claimed invention.

11) The examiner did not provide a reason or analysis of why references would be combined. Alas, this is mostly a taunt for the examiner to come back with a cooked-up rationale. Attacking the rationale as unrealistic may be a long shot, but take all the shots you can get.

I've been trying to come up with a list of possible attacks on prima facie obviousness, since the KSR decision came down. Your list is helpful, but pitiful (unfortunately, this is what we're left with).

I would add the following:

1. Combined references fail to teach all claim limitations--we've still got this one, lest we forget.

MPEP 2143.01

2. The proposed combination or modification would destroy the functioning of the reference, or make it unsatisfactory for its intended purpose.

MPEP 2144.05

3. Criticality of claimed ranges + evidence to that effect.

Secondary Factors

1. Commercial success (good luck)

2. Satisfaction of long felt need

3. Failure of others

4. Copying by others

IMO, KSR sort of revived the secondary considerations as a point of attack. By citing them favorably, I think the SCOTUS may force the PTO to pay more than lip service when denying patentability over these. However, obviously, more than argument will be necessary to establish their validity.

Hawk anb BierBelly,

Love your posts, here and otherwise.

If my memory serves, and it doesn't always anymore due to my advancing years, there was a Fed. Cir. decision, maybe a little after KSR, and non-precedential, in which the court found the invention non-obvious because it would have been common sense NOT to combine the references, or in other words, that it would have been uncommon sense to combine the references.

I think the case involved a situation where reference A had an element for performing a particular function and the court said there was nothing, including common sense, that would provide one of ordinary skill in the art with a reason to swap that element with another, different element from reference B for performing the same function. Kind of cutting against that whole "interchangeability" reasoning for combining.

I'll keep your lists in mind, but what I've found since KSR is that it's just easier to make a technical argument. Explain why the proposed modification or combination just wouldn't be done, wouldn't make sense, wouldn't be beneficial.

進步性的答辯方向（一）

進步性的答辯方向（一）

此連結為ksr判例後進步性判斷之教育訓練的講義，可以參考看看，內容提供了一些將來進行進步性答辯時，可以參考的答辯方向。

有利的答辯方向：
請求項仍可被准允專利，因為：
（一）存在不足夠的事實；或由申請人所提供之具說服力的說明，此說明係能夠否定所發現之事實的至少其一。
（二）存在二次考量，例如商業成功、長期的需求及不可預期的效果。
（三）所請的元件不能被已知的方法組合。
（四）所請的多數元件不單僅執行每一元件個別所執行的功能。


關於第一點，審查員考慮方向：
※請求項是否被給與了它們的最大合理解釋？[說明書中]是否存在有特定的定義？
※檢索是否值得信賴？你是否單僅為一個缺少的特點進行檢索？
※參考文獻是否已被適當地解釋及考慮，用以得到[此組合為]常識的結論，以及此些參考文獻教導了此行業者什麼知識？

心得：
1、向審查員解釋請求項用語的定義相異於參考文獻的用語。
2、檢查是否有一參考文獻僅揭示請求項中的一個元件，並進行[……我還沒想到的答辯方向……]。

關於第二點：
※於KSR中的基本理由係依賴可預期的結果及可預想的成功，二次考量可以用來討論此等。關於評估二次考量之說服性的提示，請參考MPEP 716至716.04，以及132宣誓書的部分）。

關於第三點：
※例如，由於技術上的困難。[應留意]這不同於因缺少動機而不會想到將所請元件加以組合。
※能夠適用關於“相反教示”及“破壞了教示”的論點，但應小心。請參照MPEP 2145 Section X. D. “References Teach Away from the Invention or Render Prior Art Unsatisfactory for Intended Purpose”；以及MPEP 2141.02 與2143.01。
※能夠適用關於“後見之明”的論點，但應小心。請參照MPEP 2145 Section X. A. “Impermissible Hindsight”。 後見之明的論點需克服所發現的事實及說明於基本理由的結論。
※能夠適用關於“可預期的成功”的論點，但應小心。請參照MPEP 2143.02 “Reasonable Expectation of Success is Required”。於電子案中可能性較稀少。


另外，於該講義中還說明了部分不太可能成功的答辯方向，答辯時可避免僅考慮該些答辯方式：
※申請人單僅陳述或爭論：智財局沒有確立進步性的初步表面證據；智財局所依賴的常識沒有文件證據的支持。單僅是此些陳述或爭論不被認為是實質且適足的反證理由；或不被認為是對於拒絕理由之有效的反駁（參考37 CFR 1.111(b)）。

組合發明的進步性

In that case (Sakraida 1976), the Court held that a combination which only unites old elements with no change in their respective functions is precluded from patentability under 103(a).

http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/10/ksr_v_teleflex_.html

因此，各舊元件的組合，必須是舊元件都有了新的功能，才能具有進步性。

進步性

Obviousness

CAFC於此案例中澄清顯而易知性拒絕理由的基本規則。

The CAFC (04-1616) in this case further clarified the ground rules for obviousness rejection.

Board

Bord 認為發明之使用目的不足以支持可專利性，其指出「所請求裝置其被意圖之使用的方式，不足以區別出“所請求裝置”與”滿足所請求裝置之限制條件的先前技術”間的差異」

First, the Board rejected the argument that the invention’s intended use supports patentability, noting that “the manner in which a claimed apparatus is intended to be employed does not differentiate the claimed apparatus [from] a prior art apparatus satisfying the claimed structural limitations.” Id. at 5-6. Second, the Board rejected the argument that because “the purposes of the [prior art] references . . . are different from the [invention’s] purpose,” the invention is non-obvious, explaining that “[t]he law . . . does not require that references be combined for reasons contemplated by an inventor” and that “prior art need not suggest the same problem set forth by appellant.”

CAFC

要考慮顯而易知性分析的動機時，所審查之欲解決的問題並不特定於本發明所欲解決的問題，而是在創作本發明前發明人所遇到的一般性問題。

此句話的意思是，作為表面初步證據的引證案，其說明書中所提及之所欲解決的問題，即使不相同於本發明，亦為適格的表面初步證據。

In considering motivation in the obviousness analysis, the problem examined is not the specific problem solved by the invention but the general problem that confronted the inventor before the invention was made. See, e.g., Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“One of ordinary skill in the art need not see the identical problem addressed in a prior art reference to be motivated to apply its teachings.”); Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Although the suggestion to combine references may flow from the nature of the problem, ‘[d]efining the problem in terms of its solution reveals improper hindsight in the selection of the prior art relevant to obviousness.’” (internal citation omitted) (quoting Monarch Knitting Mach. Corp. v. Sulzer Morat GmbH, 139 F.3d 877, 881 (Fed. Cir. 1998))); In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[T]he law does not require that the references be combined for the reasons contemplated by the inventor.”); Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v. Beckman Coulter, Inc., 411 F.3d 1332, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (characterizing the relevant inquiry as “[would] an artisan of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, confronted by the same problems as the inventor and with no knowledge of the claimed invention,[] have selected the various elements from the prior art and combined them in the manner claimed”); see also Graham, 383 U.S. at 35 (characterizing the problem as involving mechanical closures rather than in terms more specific to the patent in the context of determining the pertinent prior art). Therefore, the “motivation-suggestion-teaching” test asks not merely what the references disclose, but whether a person of ordinary skill in the art, possessed with the understandings and knowledge reflected in the prior art, and motivated by the general problem facing the inventor, would have been led to make the combination recited in the claims. See Cross Med. Prods., 424 F.3d at 1321-24. From this it may be determined whether the overall disclosures, teachings, and suggestions of the prior art, and the level of skill in the art—i.e., the understandings and knowledge of persons having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention—support the legal conclusion of obviousness. See Princeton Biochemicals, 411 F.3d at 1338 (pointing to evidence supplying detailed analysis of the prior art and the reasons one of ordinary skill would have possessed the knowledge and motivation to combine).

==================

intended use,  is intended to be employed  使用目的

【美專】teach away 相反教示

teach away 相反教示，當沒有答辯理由的時候常會被拿來用，不過看來好像一點都沒有用，因為教人往一個方向走，並不代表教人不要往另一個方向走。也許這是很簡單的道理，可是在沒有很清楚說不行的時候，總會忍不住想要拿來用用。我覺得還是不要亂用好了，不然給審查委員（因為小弟目前還不夠格遇不到法官）增加拒絕理由的內容，減少審查委員思考其他的理由的負擔，這樣比較來起很虧。

http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/04-1252.pdf
"What the prior art teaches, whether it teaches away from the claimed invention, and whether it motivates a combination of teachings from different references are questions of fact." In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1199-1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

What a reference teaches a person of ordinary skill is not, as Syntex's expert appears to believe, limited to what a reference specifically "talks about" or what is specifically "mentioned" or “written” in the reference. Under the proper legal standard, a reference will teach away when it suggests that the developments flowing from its disclosures are unlikely to produce the objective of the applicant's invention. In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). A statement that a particular combination is not a preferred embodiment does not teach away absent clear discouragement of that combination. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d at 1199-1200.

teaching 並不僅限於「what a reference specifically "talks about" or what is specifically "mentioned" or “written” in the reference」。

【判例】文字摘錄

http://fedcir.gov/opinions/04-1405.pdf

That which infringes, if later, would anticipate, if earlier.
引證案如果作為後案會侵權本案，則作為前案就會預見本案。
the question whether a reference ‘teaches away’ from the invention is inapplicable to an anticipation analysis.
teaches away不適合用作新穎性的分析。

Upsher-Smith concedes that the European Application contains every element of the asserted claims of the ’624 and ’646 patents except the limitation “essentially free of antioxidants.” Nevertheless, Upsher-Smith argues that because the European Application optionally includes antioxidants the district court erred in finding that it anticipates a limitation that expressly excludes antioxidants.

First, Upsher-Smith argues that the district court erred by placing the burden on Upsher-Smith to prove that the negative limitation was not found in the prior art rather than on Pamlab to prove the presence of the negative limitation in the prior art. The district court did not so err. A century-old axiom of patent law holds that a product “which would literally infringe if later in time anticipates if earlier.” Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); accord Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889) (“That which infringes, if later, would anticipate, if earlier.”). The European Application’s “optional inclusion” of antioxidants teaches vitamin supplement compositions that both do and do not contain antioxidants. Thus, because compositions made according to the European Application that do not contain antioxidants would infringe the asserted claims of the ’624 and ’646 patents, those compositions anticipate the asserted claims despite no express teaching to exclude the antioxidants in the European Application. Consequently, Pamlab presented a prima facie case of anticipation, and the district court properly placed the burden on Upsher-Smith to present rebuttal evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact of no anticipation by the European Application.

In an attempt to rebut Pamlab’s evidence of anticipation, Upsher-Smith argues that the European Application’s discussion of the benefits of adding antioxidants to the compositions actually teaches away from expressly excluding antioxidants. However, “a reference is no less anticipatory if, after disclosing the invention, the reference then disparages it. Thus, the question whether a reference ‘teaches away’ from the invention is inapplicable to an anticipation analysis.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 246 F.3d at 1378 (quoting Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Consequently, this argument does not raise an issue of material fact.
Upsher-Smith argues next that the European Application teaches a “genus” of compositions that cannot anticipate the “species” compositions claimed in the ’624 and ’646 patents. This court has recognized that a prior “genus” will not necessarily prevent patenting of a “species.” Eli Lilly & Co. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wa., 334 F.3d 1264, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2003). However, this principle is not applicable to the facts of this case because the asserted claims of the ’624 and ’646 patents are not limited to a “species” of the compositions taught by the European Application. The compositions claimed in the ’624 and ’646 patents are as equally broad as the compositions taught by the European Application without antioxidants. Consequently, the claims of the ’624 and ’646 patents are not “species” of the compositions taught by the European Application.

At the heart of this case, Dr. Herbert appears to have been the first to precisely articulate that antioxidants destroy vitamin B12 and folate. Consequently, he observed that vitamin supplement compositions comprising vitamin B12 and folate are more effective without antioxidants. At the time of Dr. Herbert’s observation, however, vitamin supplement compositions consisting of vitamin B12 and folate and essentially free of antioxidants were known in the prior art. While this court does not discount the significance of Dr. Herbert’s discovery, “[t]he public remains free to make, use or sell prior art compositions or processes, regardless of whether or not they understand their complete makeup or the underlying scientific principles which allow them to operate.” Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 1999); accord Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Consequently, Dr. Herbert’s discovery of the scientific principles explaining the reasons that prior art vitamin supplement compositions comprising vitamin B12 and folate and essentially free of antioxidants are more effective than similar compositions containing antioxidants does not entitle him to remove that prior art from the public domain by patenting those compositions.
This case comes very close to the reasoning in EMI Group North America, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 268 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In that case, this court explained that people had used fires for thousands of years before the first discovery of oxygen as a component of combustion. The first discoverer of the role of oxygen could not have hypothetically claimed a method of making fire with oxygen. Id. at 1351. Similarly, Dr. Herbert cannot withdraw some vitamin compositions from the public domain by explaining or purporting to claim the scientific underpinnings of their operation.