權利範圍差異化 (doctrine of claim differentiation)
智慧財產法院98年度民專訴字第29號判決指出：「除有特別之限定情形外，不同編號之請求項具有個別獨立之權利範圍」
9/16/2010
Markush claim及“擇一用語”
Markush claim及“擇一用語”
當使用 Markush claim時，若審查員找到前案揭示A， 即可不必審B~G而直接核駁整個 Markush claim。Markush claim其實是一種“個人創造“的上位用語，當下位被揭露後，這個“個人創造“的上位用語即可被視為“不具新穎性”。當下位被認為顯而易知後，這個“個人創造“的上位用語即可被視為“顯而易知”。
個人認為，當使用 Markush claim時，就可推定申請人已認為 「A B C D E F and G」之間，對本領域具有通常知識者，是可互相替代的。因此，於審查中，審查員甚至可以推定B~G 為顯而易知並加以核駁。
當然，還是可以進行答辯，只是要克服前述的“推定”，申請人需要花比較多的舉證責任，證明B~G的進步性。答辯方式可以比照下位被揭露的情況，進行答辯。
因此，建議若一開始就認為下位概念「A」、「B C and D」及「E F and G」」之間是不可互相替代的，互相具有進步性，希望審查員個別進行檢索及審查，就應該要分三個claim寫。當然這會有「單一性」的問題。
此外，不單純是Markush claim，使用“or”用語的情況也適用。
http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/205/205.F2d.185.5935.html
If on examination of a generic Markush type claim, it be found that the applicant has included one or more members known to be old in the art for the same purpose as in the applicant's invention, the group in its entirety must fail of recognition in exactly the same manner as would have been the case had the group of elements of the claim been identified by a single term. In such contingency, a formula of lesser scope may be invoked, provided that the remaining members of the group have a common quality which is distinctive from the characteristics of the major group, and which itself imparts patentable merit to the subgroup over the generic group. In re Hass et al., supra.3
答辯的重點。
provided that the remaining members of the group have a common quality which is distinctive from the characteristics of the major group, and which itself imparts patentable merit to the subgroup over the generic group.
由於申請人一開始就使用Markush claim代表A B C and D具有a first common quality。因此最好的答辯理由是「B C and D」的具有a second common quality different from the first common quality。
個人認為就是因為申請人一開始使用Markush claim，才讓審查員被教導成A B C and D間具有common quality，能夠發揮相同的功能、達成相同的功效，如此才會變得較難答辯。審查員少了找出common quality的舉證責任。所以，假如一開始申請人初步判斷A B C and D間可能會被認為具有common quality能夠發揮相同的功能、達成相同的功效，就要刻意的閃躲，即使自己已認為有common quality，也要刻意地用沒有common quality的語氣來撰寫，清楚的表明申請人從不認為A B C and D間具有common quality，並分三個claim寫或分三個案子申請，這樣子後續的答辯會較輕鬆。
當然，現實與理想，相差很遠，個人想說的僅是理論，
其他，還可以試著用如下極端的方式答辯，亦即雖然申請人使用Markush claim，但A B C and D間卻沒有common quality，亦可以直接承認誤用（當然誤用兩字不必要寫於理由書中），直接向審查員說明A B C and D間卻沒有common quality。但「B C and D」的具有a common quality而且是patentable的。
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/0800_803_02.htm
MPEP
This subsection deals with Markush-type generic claims which recite a plurality of alternatively usable substances or members. In most cases, a recitation by enumeration is used because there is no appropriate or true generic language. A Markush-type claim may include independent and distinct inventions. This is true where two or more of the members are so unrelated and diverse that a prior art reference anticipating the claim with respect to one of the members would not render the claim obvious under 35 U.S.C. 103 with respect to the other member(s). In applications containing a Markush-type claim that encompasses at least two independent or distinct inventions, the examiner may require a provisional election of a single species prior to examination on the merits. An examiner should set forth a requirement for election of a single disclosed species in a Markush-type claim using form paragraph 8.01 when claims limited to species are present or using form paragraph 8.02 when no species claims are present. See MPEP § 808.01(a) and § 809.02(a). Following election, the Markush-type claim will be examined fully with respect to the elected species and further to the extent necessary to determine patentability. If the Markush-type claim is not allowable **, the provisional election will be given effect and examination will be limited to the Markush-type claim and claims to the elected species, with claims drawn to species patentably distinct from the elected species held withdrawn from further consideration.
(Landis Mechanics of Patent Claim Drafting Textbook, Page 6-9). Where claiming alternative compounds, they must not be "patentably distinct" under present Office practice; otherwise, they need only have a common property useful in the combination claimed.
當使用 Markush claim時，若審查員找到前案揭示A， 即可不必審B~G而直接核駁整個 Markush claim。Markush claim其實是一種“個人創造“的上位用語，當下位被揭露後，這個“個人創造“的上位用語即可被視為“不具新穎性”。當下位被認為顯而易知後，這個“個人創造“的上位用語即可被視為“顯而易知”。
個人認為，當使用 Markush claim時，就可推定申請人已認為 「A B C D E F and G」之間，對本領域具有通常知識者，是可互相替代的。因此，於審查中，審查員甚至可以推定B~G 為顯而易知並加以核駁。
當然，還是可以進行答辯，只是要克服前述的“推定”，申請人需要花比較多的舉證責任，證明B~G的進步性。答辯方式可以比照下位被揭露的情況，進行答辯。
因此，建議若一開始就認為下位概念「A」、「B C and D」及「E F and G」」之間是不可互相替代的，互相具有進步性，希望審查員個別進行檢索及審查，就應該要分三個claim寫。當然這會有「單一性」的問題。
此外，不單純是Markush claim，使用“or”用語的情況也適用。
http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/205/205.F2d.185.5935.html
If on examination of a generic Markush type claim, it be found that the applicant has included one or more members known to be old in the art for the same purpose as in the applicant's invention, the group in its entirety must fail of recognition in exactly the same manner as would have been the case had the group of elements of the claim been identified by a single term. In such contingency, a formula of lesser scope may be invoked, provided that the remaining members of the group have a common quality which is distinctive from the characteristics of the major group, and which itself imparts patentable merit to the subgroup over the generic group. In re Hass et al., supra.3
答辯的重點。
provided that the remaining members of the group have a common quality which is distinctive from the characteristics of the major group, and which itself imparts patentable merit to the subgroup over the generic group.
【2010年10月20日更新】
以「金,銀,銅,鐵或錫」為例，若找到的前案為「鐵」，此時申請人希望將其限縮至「金」為例。
「a formula of lesser scope」是指「金」的範圍。
「the remaining members of the group」相對於「the major group」，「the remaining members」 加「the major group」等於「the group」。「the remaining members of the group」中，「the remaining members」是指「金」、「the group」是指「金,銀,銅,鐵或錫」。「the major group」是指「銀,銅,鐵或錫」。
「the subgroup」是指「金」，「the generic group」是指「金,銀,銅,鐵或錫」。
「the characteristics of 」和「 a common quality 」個人認為大致上同義，僅是法官希望用不同的用語來表示不同的範圍。「characteristics 」可為導電性，而「a common quality」可為不易氧化的性質。
由於申請人一開始就使用Markush claim代表A B C and D具有a first common quality。因此最好的答辯理由是「B C and D」的具有a second common quality different from the first common quality。
個人認為就是因為申請人一開始使用Markush claim，才讓審查員被教導成A B C and D間具有common quality，能夠發揮相同的功能、達成相同的功效，如此才會變得較難答辯。審查員少了找出common quality的舉證責任。所以，假如一開始申請人初步判斷A B C and D間可能會被認為具有common quality能夠發揮相同的功能、達成相同的功效，就要刻意的閃躲，即使自己已認為有common quality，也要刻意地用沒有common quality的語氣來撰寫，清楚的表明申請人從不認為A B C and D間具有common quality，並分三個claim寫或分三個案子申請，這樣子後續的答辯會較輕鬆。
當然，現實與理想，相差很遠，個人想說的僅是理論，
其他，還可以試著用如下極端的方式答辯，亦即雖然申請人使用Markush claim，但A B C and D間卻沒有common quality，亦可以直接承認誤用（當然誤用兩字不必要寫於理由書中），直接向審查員說明A B C and D間卻沒有common quality。但「B C and D」的具有a common quality而且是patentable的。
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/0800_803_02.htm
MPEP
This subsection deals with Markush-type generic claims which recite a plurality of alternatively usable substances or members. In most cases, a recitation by enumeration is used because there is no appropriate or true generic language. A Markush-type claim may include independent and distinct inventions. This is true where two or more of the members are so unrelated and diverse that a prior art reference anticipating the claim with respect to one of the members would not render the claim obvious under 35 U.S.C. 103 with respect to the other member(s). In applications containing a Markush-type claim that encompasses at least two independent or distinct inventions, the examiner may require a provisional election of a single species prior to examination on the merits. An examiner should set forth a requirement for election of a single disclosed species in a Markush-type claim using form paragraph 8.01 when claims limited to species are present or using form paragraph 8.02 when no species claims are present. See MPEP § 808.01(a) and § 809.02(a). Following election, the Markush-type claim will be examined fully with respect to the elected species and further to the extent necessary to determine patentability. If the Markush-type claim is not allowable **, the provisional election will be given effect and examination will be limited to the Markush-type claim and claims to the elected species, with claims drawn to species patentably distinct from the elected species held withdrawn from further consideration.
5/14/2010
“inoperative”、”enablement” 的區別
“inoperative”、”enablement”區別
要學會“用字”還真難，感覺上這幾個字的意思都很像，可是法官卻用來表達他們想要表達的不同意思。
http://www.chanesq.com/cases/cases16.html
The district court essentially concluded that the invention claimed in the patents at issue simply did not work, that is, could not clean wafers, and therefore it would require undue experimentation to carry out the invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). This court has recognized the relationship between the enablement requirement of § 112 and the utility requirement of § 101. See, e.g., In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("[I]f the claims in an application fail to meet the utility requirement because the invention is inoperative, they also fail to meet the enablement requirement because a person skilled in the art cannot practice the invention"); EMI Group N. Am., Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 268 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In this case, however, the district court similarly set the standard for utility too high for this invention. While the district court's major premise is correct that an inoperable invention is not enabled, the district court erred in its minor premise that the claimed invention is inoperable and lacks utility.
The inoperability standard for utility applies primarily to claims with impossible limitations. See, e.g., Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (claims found inoperable because they require violating the principle of conservation of mass); Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (claims to a perpetual motion machine ruled inoperable). Moreover, where a patent discloses several alternative combinations of methods (as most systems claims will), the party asserting inoperability must show that all disclosed alternatives are inoperative or not enabled. EMI Group, 268 F.3d at 1349. The '532 and '123 patents do not claim an impossible result or an inoperative invention.
Even if the single Full Flow embodiment does not achieve complete cleaning, that alone would not render the invention inoperative.
再參考MPEP 2164.07 的內容
For example, if an applicant has claimed a process of treating a certain disease condition with a certain compound and provided a credible basis for asserting that the compound is useful in that regard, but to actually practice the invention as claimed a person skilled in the relevant art would have to engage in an undue amount of experimentation, the claim may be defective under 35 U.S.C. 112, but not 35 U.S.C. 101.
http://www.patent-tutorial.net/content/forum/1880
這裏提到的是若有「limitation impossible to meet」是違反 § 112，而不是§ 101。
"a claim containing a limitation impossible to meet may be held invalid under § 112. Moreover, when a claim requires a means for accomplishing an unattainable result, the claimed invention must be considered inoperative as claimed and the claim must be held invalid under either § 101 or § 112 of 35 U.S.C."
一些自己的想法。
如果是在還沒有發明“電燈”的年代。
「電燈、電發光裝置」，就是屬於「limitation impossible to meet」。但是並不屬於「a means for accomplishing an unattainable result」。
如果是在還沒有發明“電”的年代。
也許「電燈、電發光裝置」就會被認為「a means for accomplishing an unattainable result」。更嚴重一點也許發明人會被是個瘋子也說不定。
「電發光裝置」屬於功能性用語，對於這種用語的解釋很多需要考慮到現行技術的水平。
要學會“用字”還真難，感覺上這幾個字的意思都很像，可是法官卻用來表達他們想要表達的不同意思。
http://www.chanesq.com/cases/cases16.html
The district court essentially concluded that the invention claimed in the patents at issue simply did not work, that is, could not clean wafers, and therefore it would require undue experimentation to carry out the invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). This court has recognized the relationship between the enablement requirement of § 112 and the utility requirement of § 101. See, e.g., In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("[I]f the claims in an application fail to meet the utility requirement because the invention is inoperative, they also fail to meet the enablement requirement because a person skilled in the art cannot practice the invention"); EMI Group N. Am., Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 268 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In this case, however, the district court similarly set the standard for utility too high for this invention. While the district court's major premise is correct that an inoperable invention is not enabled, the district court erred in its minor premise that the claimed invention is inoperable and lacks utility.
The inoperability standard for utility applies primarily to claims with impossible limitations. See, e.g., Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (claims found inoperable because they require violating the principle of conservation of mass); Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (claims to a perpetual motion machine ruled inoperable). Moreover, where a patent discloses several alternative combinations of methods (as most systems claims will), the party asserting inoperability must show that all disclosed alternatives are inoperative or not enabled. EMI Group, 268 F.3d at 1349. The '532 and '123 patents do not claim an impossible result or an inoperative invention.
Even if the single Full Flow embodiment does not achieve complete cleaning, that alone would not render the invention inoperative.
再參考MPEP 2164.07 的內容
For example, if an applicant has claimed a process of treating a certain disease condition with a certain compound and provided a credible basis for asserting that the compound is useful in that regard, but to actually practice the invention as claimed a person skilled in the relevant art would have to engage in an undue amount of experimentation, the claim may be defective under 35 U.S.C. 112, but not 35 U.S.C. 101.
http://www.patent-tutorial.net/content/forum/1880
這裏提到的是若有「limitation impossible to meet」是違反 § 112，而不是§ 101。
"a claim containing a limitation impossible to meet may be held invalid under § 112. Moreover, when a claim requires a means for accomplishing an unattainable result, the claimed invention must be considered inoperative as claimed and the claim must be held invalid under either § 101 or § 112 of 35 U.S.C."
一些自己的想法。
如果是在還沒有發明“電燈”的年代。
「電燈、電發光裝置」，就是屬於「limitation impossible to meet」。但是並不屬於「a means for accomplishing an unattainable result」。
如果是在還沒有發明“電”的年代。
也許「電燈、電發光裝置」就會被認為「a means for accomplishing an unattainable result」。更嚴重一點也許發明人會被是個瘋子也說不定。
「電發光裝置」屬於功能性用語，對於這種用語的解釋很多需要考慮到現行技術的水平。
3/31/2008
Claim Differentiation 權利範圍差異化理論
這篇原文，來自日本知財研究所的研究報告書關於“均等論”的一篇研究報告 ，一開始我也覺得很奇怪為什麼會“均等論”與“權利範圍差異化理論”一起討論比較。
適用される場合
A) 異なるクレームは異なる範囲をカバーする(*27)。
B) 従属クレームの限定は、それが従属するところの独立クレームには読み込まない(*28)。
C) 従属クレームに対応した実施形態や機能と異なるものが開示されている場合、独立クレームはそれを含むことが考慮される。(異なる独立クレーム間の関係の場合も同様)(*29)
適用情況
a、相異的請求項包含相異的範圍。
b、附屬項的限定，不應被讀進其所附屬的獨立項。
c、於揭示相異於對應附屬項的實施樣態或機能的內容時，視為獨立項包含該內容（於相異獨立項間之關係的情況下亦然）。
適用されない場合
D) 文言表現の違いのみで内容が同じ場合は、理論は適用されない(*30)。
E) 明細書開示の内容、審査経過による主張から決まる範囲をこの理論で超えることはできない(*31)。
F) 二つの異なるクレーム間の相違が単に付加的でない場合、理論は適用されない(*32)。
G) 機能的文言による「構造的均等物」の推定がこの理論に反する場合は、機能的文言による推定の方が優先される(§112パラグラフ6の推定の方が、Claim Differentiationの推定より強い)(*33)。
不適用情況
d、 僅為文字表現的差異，內容則相同時，不適用此理論。
e、不能夠以此理論，使權利範圍超出依據說明書的揭示內容、審查過程的主張所決定的範圍。
f、 兩相異請求項間的不同處，並非單僅是附加的情況時，不適用此理論。
g、 依功能性語言決定的「構造的均等物」的推定，相反於此理論時，優先考慮依功能性語言的推定（112第6段的推定優先於Claim Differentiation的推定。）。
上記A)～C)うち、B)の場合が一番強い推定が働く(*34)。つまり、この理論の基本的な使い方は、B)を利用し独立項に読み込みたくない限定を従属項として明記しておくことになる。また、すべてのクレーム間で対応する実施形態や機能が異なるように解釈される(*35)ため、任意の二つのクレーム間の関係として与えてもよい。
上述a~c中，b情況具有最強的推定。亦即，此理論的基本使用方法為，利用b情況將不希望被讀進獨立項的限制條件明確記載成附屬項。另外，為使所有項求項之間，被解釋成相異的對應實施樣態或機能，可以利用此理論付予任意二請求項間的關係（怎麼翻都翻不順總覺此句原文少了點什麼）。
しかし、あくまで二つのクレーム間の相対関係を基本としているので、F)のように両者の違いが一義的に決まらないと、他方も決まらない。また、この推定は決して強いものではなく、その他の根拠から適正と考えられる範囲を超えることはできず、その場合は複数のクレームが同じ範囲を示すこともある(*36)。
然而，最終兩者請求項間的相對關係才是基本，如f情況不能無疑義地決定兩者的差異時，另一方亦不能決定。又，此推定絕非強的推定，不能夠超出從其他根據適當地考量後的範圍，此情況下，有時會有複數個請求項具有相同的範圍。
また、独立クレームが機能的クレームの場合はG)に示した機能的クレームの構造的均等物との関係から、機能的文言の一形態としての構造クレームは不要と思われる。すなわち、機能的限定の構造的均等物が実施形態に限定解釈された場合、機能的文言による推定の方が強いためにClaim Differentiationの推定では機能的限定の範囲を拡大できず、構造クレームが意味をなさないためである。この場合は、機能的クレームの構造的均等物を拡大させることの方が重要になる。
獨立項為功能請求項時，不應利用與g情況所示之功能請求項之構造的均等物間的關係，解釋成構造的請求項作為功能性語言的一樣態。亦即，功能限定之構造的均等物被限定解釋成實施樣態時，依功能語言的推定較強，所以不能利用Claim Differentiation的推定擴大功能限定的範圍，不能視為具有構造請求項的意思。此情況，擴大功能請求項之構造的均等物較為重要。
(＊27) 384 F.2d 391, 404, 413-414 (Ct.Cl. 1967).
(＊28) 403 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed.Cir. 2005).
(＊29) 415 F.3d 1303, 1324-27 (Fed.Cir. 2005).
(＊30) 384 F.2d at 407 (Ct.Cl. 1967).
(＊31) 831 F.2d 1017, 1023-24 (1987).
(＊32) 73 F.3d 1573, 1580-81 (Fed.Cir. 1996).
(＊33) 424 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed.Cir. 2005).
(＊34) 413 F.3d at 1368-69 (Fed.Cir.2005).
(＊35) 403 F.3d at 1370 (Fed.Cir.2005).
(＊36) 413 F.3d at 1369 (Fed.Cir.2005).
(＊37) 最高裁平成10年2月24日 判決民集52巻1号113頁 平6(オ)1083号「ボールスプライン軸受上告審」。
3/30/2008
混合類別型請求項
混合類別型請求項 Mixed Claim Types
撰寫請求項時，應留意於此請求項中是否同時記載了“裝置限制條件”及“方法限制條件”，其有可能會被視為不明確。
Manual of Patent Examination Procedure. § 2173.05(p)(II) (1999) ("A single claim which claims both an apparatus and the method steps of using the apparatus is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph.")
MPEP § 2173.05(p)(II) 記載有：單一的請求項同時請求“裝置”及“使用該裝置的方法步驟”，係為不明確，不符合 35 U.S.C. 112 第二段規定。
The November 2005 IPXL Holdings v. Amazon CAFC ruling found claim 25 in the notorious Amazon 1-click patent (6,149,055) indefinite.
25. The system of claim 2 [including an input means] wherein the predicted transaction information comprises both a transaction type and transaction parameters associated with that transaction type, and the user uses the input means to either change the predicted transaction information or accept the displayed transaction type and transaction parameters.
The problem was that the claim could have been read either as a system claim or method claim.
Thus, it is unclear whether infringement of claim 25 occurs when one creates a system that allows the user to change the predicted transaction information or accept the displayed transaction, or whether infringement occurs when the user actually uses the input means to change transaction information or uses the input means to accept a displayed transaction.
上述請求項的問題為，此請求項可以被解讀成為系統請求項、或是方法請求項。因此，是在有人創造一個能夠允許使用者改變預測的交易資訊或接受所顯示之交易的系統時，發生侵權請求項25行為；還是當使用者實際使用輸入裝置改變預測的交易資訊或使用輸入裝置接受所顯示之交易時，發生侵權請求項25行為？關於此點不明確。
心得：
〉●從文言上來看是可以解譯成「當使用者實際使用輸入裝置改變預測的交易資訊或使用輸入裝置接受所顯示之交易時的系統」，從這一點來看，其實一點也不會不明確。不知為何這種解譯方式不被接受？
〉●想要使用“功能限制條件”來限定“裝置”的請求項時應小心並再確認這樣的撰寫方式，是否會被解讀為混合類別型請求項。
〉●似乎僅需將原請求項修改成「the system allows the user to use the input means to」，這樣就不會被視為不明確了，差幾個字就差那麼多難以想像。建議以後撰寫請求項時，多多使用“用以”、“藉以使”等用語。
〉●不過，上述的情況和 MPEP 2106所記載的內容，兩者間滿容易混淆
For example, a claimed invention may be a combination of devices that appear to be directed to a machine and one or more steps of the functions performed by the machine. Such instances of mixed attributes, although potentially confusing as to which category of patentable subject matter the claim belongs, does not affect the analysis to be performed by USPTO personnel. Note that an apparatus claim with process steps is not classified as a "hybrid" claim; instead, it is simply an apparatus claim including functional limitations. See, e.g., R.A.C.C. Indus. v. Stun-Tech, Inc., 178 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (unpublished).
應注意，具有方法步驟的裝置請求項，不被分類為混合類別型請求項，相反地，它僅是一種包含功能限制條件的裝置請求項。
心得：
〉●要分清楚此兩者間的界線，也許可以參考The Patent Prospector的意見。
The cutting edge for an non-statutory dual-matter claim is whether the claim could be reasonably read "either-or" - interpretable within two of the four categories of patentable subject matter: "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" (35 U.S.C. §101). Another viewpoint would be to answer the question: what is crucial, specifically novel, about the claim that merits its patentability? If the answer lies in a different claim type than the claim nominally is, the claim is invalid.
另一觀點為回答下述問題：使請求項維持其可專利性，什麼限制條件是重要的，尤其是針對新穎性而言？如果所得答案為此請求項落入了不同於它名目上的類別時，則此請求項無效。
2/12/2008
靜態用語及動態用語
Patently-O
Claimed "Insert" Limitation Creates Product by Process
“insert（插入物）” 解釋成“用以插入的物”
On appeal, the CAFC agreed with Miken that the insert limitation required an element that was “put or fit into something else.” Consequently, Miken’s products cannot infringe because the accused structural members were never “inserted or intended for insertion.”
因此，不能解釋成“內部結構元件”“多牆結構”。
Miken Composites v. Wilson Sporting Goods (Fed. Cir. 2008)
To contend, however, as Wilson does, that it does not matter whether an insert is placed into a pre-existing frame or whether a frame is built around it ignores that ordinary and customary meaning, notwithstanding Wilson’s attempts to categorize the term “insert” as “purely structural.” The issue would have been different if the claims contained the language argued in Wilson’s briefs; to wit, “internal structural member,” Wilson Br. at 31, 38, or “multi-wall product,” Reply Br. at 3, but they do not. It is the language of the claims not the argument that governs.
心得：
標的為物之Claim中，所使用的語言，最好儘量使用靜態用語及結構性的用語，少使用具有動詞暗示性的用語。
使用動態用語或動詞暗示性的用語，很有可能會被解釋成Product by Process的claim，雖然判決中法官說不是Product by Process而是功能代表結構的用語，但我怎麼看怎麼讀都覺得是滿像Product by Process。
As for Wilson’s contention that the district court impermissibly imported a process limitation into a product claim, we disagree. As we have discussed, the district court merely adopted an ordinary meaning of the term “insert.” Summary Judgment Opinion at 11. That this ordinary meaning has functional attributes does not change the fact that the claim recites a structural component, albeit one possessed with certain understood characteristics.
2/04/2008
Doctrine of Full Scope Enablement 致能整個請求範圍
CAFC Continues to Expand Doctrine of Full Scope Enablement
When analyzing enablement, the court looks to ensure that the “full scope of the invention” is enabled — and thus looking beyond whether the particular accused design is enabled.
對致能要件進行分析時，法院在確認特定之被控侵權設計是否“被致能”前，應先確認整個發明的範圍是否被致能。
However, the “full scope” doctrine has serious deficiencies. The most notable are the potentially chaotic results from applying the doctrine to claims that include the comprising transition language. The problem arises because the comprising transition allows a claim implicitly encompass a wide variety of add on limitations that might be found in an infringing device. See, for example Automotive Technologies Int’l v. BMW (Fed. Cir. 2007) (claim scope that implicitly covered both mechanical and electrical sensor was not enabled by description of mechanical sensor); Liebel-Flarsheim v. Medrad (Fed. Cir. 2007) (claim scope that implicitly covered both jacketed and jacket-free needle holders was not enabled by description of jacketed needle holders).
最值得注意的是，將此條原則（Doctrine of Full Scope Enablement）應用於包含開放式連接詞comprising的請求項時，會導致潛在的混亂。此問題的產生原因在於，開放式連接詞允許請求項暗示地包含各種多樣的附加限制條件，而能夠於侵權物中找到該些限制條件。
心得：
- 在寫說明書時，應該小心使用comprising.
- 專利權人在進行解譯申請專利範圍時，應該小心解譯後的“整個”權利範圍，是否能被說明書所支持。
- 強化附屬項，即多寫幾個看似無用的附屬項。 例如，於Automotive Technologies Int’l v. BMW 一案中，獨立項寫sensor附屬項寫mechanical sensor。看到這種判例，才會覺得附屬項的重要性。
=========================
http://www.agc.co.jp/news/2002/0401.html
"Look Beyond"には、グループのスローガンとして、「将来を見据え」「自らの領域を超えた視点を持ち」「現状に満足せず飽くなき革新を追求する」などの意味が込められています。
http://eow.alc.co.jp/look%20beyond/UTF-8/
look beyond
～の先を思い描く（在想…之前，先……。）
・Try to look beyond the 21st century. : 21世紀より先を思い描いてごらん。
is enabled 被致能
這個詞真的很難翻譯，翻長一點會比較通順一點，即「說明書的揭露是否能夠使此行業者能夠具以實施」，此行業者是學習日文的「当業者」更正確的用語為「於此領域具有通常知識者」。
專利這行業要求用語使用正確又精簡，難！
10/15/2007
連接詞"comprised of"
http://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2007/09/comprised_of_counterfeit.html
CIAS v. Alliance Gaming and Bally Gaming (CAFC 2006-1342)
These cases reflect the general understanding and usage of "comprised of" in patent convention as having the same meaning as "comprising." For patent claims the distinction between "comprising" and "consisting" is established, along with the meaning of "comprised of" as related to "comprising," not "consisting of." Correctly construed, "comprised of" does not of itself exclude the possible presence of additional elements or steps.
“comprised of ”為開放式的用語，不過，不太明白為什麼還是會有人使用這樣的字眼。會引起爭議的話，不用就好了不是嗎？
CIAS v. Alliance Gaming and Bally Gaming (CAFC 2006-1342)
These cases reflect the general understanding and usage of "comprised of" in patent convention as having the same meaning as "comprising." For patent claims the distinction between "comprising" and "consisting" is established, along with the meaning of "comprised of" as related to "comprising," not "consisting of." Correctly construed, "comprised of" does not of itself exclude the possible presence of additional elements or steps.
“comprised of ”為開放式的用語，不過，不太明白為什麼還是會有人使用這樣的字眼。會引起爭議的話，不用就好了不是嗎？
3/05/2007
逆均等論（The Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents）
逆均等論（The Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents）
逆均等論，一般說法源起於U.S. Supreme Court於1950年Graver Tank v. Linde對均等論的判決，其指出均等論也可用於對抗專利權人，
In its 1950 decision of Graver Tank v. Linde, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that the doctrine of equivalents may also act against the interest of the patentee.8 When an accused product or proce ss is literally covered by the words of a patent claim, but is “so far changed in principle” that it performs in a “substantially different way,” the court may reach a finding of noninfringement.
但事實上，其起源應該可以推至1898年之更早的Boyden Power Brake Co. v. Westinghouse判決。
The doctrine received its genesis in Boyden Power Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537 (1898), where the Court stated:
The patentee may bring the defendant within the letter of his claims, but if the latter has so far changed the principle of the device that the claims of the patent, literally construed, have ceased to represent his actual invention, he is as little subject to be adjudged an infringer as one who has violated the letter of a statute has to be convicted, when he has done nothing in conflict with its spirit and intent.
逆均等論在實務上，很少被利用“逆均等論”來判決不侵權，原因在於：
1、被告若依逆均等論主張不侵權時，代表已承認自己的產品已落於“文義侵權”。因此，被告只有在情非得以的情況下，主張“逆均等論”才對自己有利。
2、待鑑定對象己符合「文義讀取」，但實質上未利用發明(或新型)說明所揭示之技術手段時，適用「逆均等論」。但是，當專利的權利範圍，包含“實質上未利用發明(或新型)說明所揭示之技術手段”時，是否亦代表該權利範圍應為無效，因為其已“locking enablement”及“ writtten description”。
Even with this explanation, the reverse doctrine may seem anamolous, for if the claims measure
the invention, how can the claims cease to represent the actual invention? It seems that the proper resolution of a case in which the claims exceed the scope of the disclosed invention is to
hold the claims invalid as lacking enablement or a written description.
原本應無效的專利權範圍，讓它繼續有效，而僅依逆均等論，來限縮並排除不適當的範圍，我覺得是一種施捨或說是一種折衷的方法，因為逆均等論至少給了專利權人半個麵包而不是“沒得吃”。
The Federal Circuit discussed the rationale for the reverse doctrine as follows:
The reverse doctrine of equivalents is invoked when claims are written more broadly than the
disclosure warrants. The purpose of restricting the scope of such claims is not only to avoid a holding of infringement when a court deems it appropriate, but often is to preserve the validity of claims with respect to their original intended scope.
Texas Instruments Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 846 F.2d 1369, 1372, 6 USPQ2d
1886 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (denial of rehearing). Thus, perhaps the reverse doctrine actually helps the patentee, in that it gives the patentee half-a-loaf rather than no loaf at all.
當然，它的存在也不是完全沒有道理的，它可以適用在極為不平常的案例，在迅速發展的高科技領域，產生具大的進步時，是可以給領先者超過他們貢獻的權利範圍（？應該給予超過的範圍嗎？）。只是，到目前為止，Federal Circuit還沒有遇到這樣的領域。
The reverse doctrine of equivalents was instead intended to apply to extraordinary cases. It provides courts with something of an escape hatch, useful when a finding of literal infringement would work an unwarranted extension of the claims. The reverse doctrine might pertain to rapidly progressing fields of high technology, where radical subsequent advances allow predecessor patents to appropriate subject matter entirely beyond the scope of their technical contribution. Such circumstances appear so uncommon that, in its two decades of existence, the Federal Circuit has yet to encounter them.
2002年於“ Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Resources, Inc.”說的更清楚明白，「於CAFC判例，適合逆均等論判決不侵權的判決個數為零」。逆均等論僅不過是“過時的例外”。
In Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Resources, Inc., the Federal Circuit made abundantly clear that the reverse doctrine of equivalents was of extremely limited applicability. Judge Gajarsa observed that: “Not once has this court affirmed a decision finding noninfringement based on the reverse doctrine of equivalents.” Describing the doctrine an “an
anachronistic exception,” the court refused to apply or extend the reverse doctrine of equivalents.
3、應“正確的解釋申請專利範圍”。
小弟曾於某篇文章中看到地院依逆均等論判決不侵權，但卻被CAFC法官reverse，其認為地院的權利範圍解釋錯誤，應加入“其他限制條件”，只是忘了該文章出處，也忘了該判例名稱，有點可惜，目前正在尋找當中。不過，在此介紹一個“判例”，Multiform v. Medzam (Fed. Cir 1998)，有一點點相關：
Claim 1: A packet for absorbing and immobilizing a liquid comprising an envelope which is degradable in said liquid...
Specification:"...starch paper which is degradable in water and other liquids...dissolve..."
於此案例中，權利範圍使用“degradable”但於說明書中卻使用“dissolve”，雖然被告其製品已落入“degradable”的文義範圍，但是法官沒有依逆均等論進行判決，而認為要解釋一技術用語，最好的來源為說明書及申請專利過程檔案，而將“degradable”解釋成“dissolve”，限縮了不合理的權利範圍。
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/PDF/2004DLTR0010.pdf
In other words, properly construed claims of a traditional product should be specific enough that it should not read on the nanoproduct in the first instance.
其他..
1、於”summary judgment”，是不可適用逆均等論，因為其為“事實問題”而非“法律問題”。
The closest the court came was the in banc decision in SRI International v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of America, 775 F.2d 1107, 227 USPQ 577 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (in banc), which, in a 6-5 vote, reversed a summary judgment of noninfringement based on the reverse doctrine of equivalents, finding issues of fact and remanding for trial on the issue.
2、適用方式：
http://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/reverse-doctrine-of-equivalents.html
How Does the Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents Work?
In determining whether or not to use the reverse doctrine of equivalents, a court will consider several factors:
What is the actual scope of the patent? Does it cover the new invention?
If so, should that patent extend to the new invention? This is the major issue that the reverse doctrine of equivalents must address. What is the fair scope of the patent?
Has the new invention sufficiently transformed the original invention such that it should fall outside the scope of the patent of the original invention?
參考文章如下：
一、 日本網站找到的文章：「An Analysis of Trends in the Construction of U.S. Patent Claims: 1997-2002」第24頁
http://www.iip.or.jp/summary/pdf/thomas.PDF
二、專利侵害鑑定要點草案
http://www.tipo.gov.tw/attachment/tempUpload/81786957/專利侵害鑑定要點草案.doc
三、Intellectual propert_Patent Law Course Materials.pdf
Professor Wagner
連結：一整本電子書
四、自己整理過的blog。
http://patentdic.blogspot.com/2006/02/claimcafc.html
五、PROTECTING THE NEXT SMALL THING: NANOTECHNOLOGY AND THE REVERSE
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
此篇奈米領域的專利工程師可以讀一讀。權利要求用“微小”時，某一段範圍的數值，會不會被依“逆均等論”不侵害？
逆均等論，一般說法源起於U.S. Supreme Court於1950年Graver Tank v. Linde對均等論的判決，其指出均等論也可用於對抗專利權人，
In its 1950 decision of Graver Tank v. Linde, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that the doctrine of equivalents may also act against the interest of the patentee.8 When an accused product or proce ss is literally covered by the words of a patent claim, but is “so far changed in principle” that it performs in a “substantially different way,” the court may reach a finding of noninfringement.
但事實上，其起源應該可以推至1898年之更早的Boyden Power Brake Co. v. Westinghouse判決。
The doctrine received its genesis in Boyden Power Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537 (1898), where the Court stated:
The patentee may bring the defendant within the letter of his claims, but if the latter has so far changed the principle of the device that the claims of the patent, literally construed, have ceased to represent his actual invention, he is as little subject to be adjudged an infringer as one who has violated the letter of a statute has to be convicted, when he has done nothing in conflict with its spirit and intent.
逆均等論在實務上，很少被利用“逆均等論”來判決不侵權，原因在於：
1、被告若依逆均等論主張不侵權時，代表已承認自己的產品已落於“文義侵權”。因此，被告只有在情非得以的情況下，主張“逆均等論”才對自己有利。
2、待鑑定對象己符合「文義讀取」，但實質上未利用發明(或新型)說明所揭示之技術手段時，適用「逆均等論」。但是，當專利的權利範圍，包含“實質上未利用發明(或新型)說明所揭示之技術手段”時，是否亦代表該權利範圍應為無效，因為其已“locking enablement”及“ writtten description”。
Even with this explanation, the reverse doctrine may seem anamolous, for if the claims measure
the invention, how can the claims cease to represent the actual invention? It seems that the proper resolution of a case in which the claims exceed the scope of the disclosed invention is to
hold the claims invalid as lacking enablement or a written description.
原本應無效的專利權範圍，讓它繼續有效，而僅依逆均等論，來限縮並排除不適當的範圍，我覺得是一種施捨或說是一種折衷的方法，因為逆均等論至少給了專利權人半個麵包而不是“沒得吃”。
The Federal Circuit discussed the rationale for the reverse doctrine as follows:
The reverse doctrine of equivalents is invoked when claims are written more broadly than the
disclosure warrants. The purpose of restricting the scope of such claims is not only to avoid a holding of infringement when a court deems it appropriate, but often is to preserve the validity of claims with respect to their original intended scope.
Texas Instruments Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 846 F.2d 1369, 1372, 6 USPQ2d
1886 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (denial of rehearing). Thus, perhaps the reverse doctrine actually helps the patentee, in that it gives the patentee half-a-loaf rather than no loaf at all.
當然，它的存在也不是完全沒有道理的，它可以適用在極為不平常的案例，在迅速發展的高科技領域，產生具大的進步時，是可以給領先者超過他們貢獻的權利範圍（？應該給予超過的範圍嗎？）。只是，到目前為止，Federal Circuit還沒有遇到這樣的領域。
The reverse doctrine of equivalents was instead intended to apply to extraordinary cases. It provides courts with something of an escape hatch, useful when a finding of literal infringement would work an unwarranted extension of the claims. The reverse doctrine might pertain to rapidly progressing fields of high technology, where radical subsequent advances allow predecessor patents to appropriate subject matter entirely beyond the scope of their technical contribution. Such circumstances appear so uncommon that, in its two decades of existence, the Federal Circuit has yet to encounter them.
2002年於“ Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Resources, Inc.”說的更清楚明白，「於CAFC判例，適合逆均等論判決不侵權的判決個數為零」。逆均等論僅不過是“過時的例外”。
In Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Resources, Inc., the Federal Circuit made abundantly clear that the reverse doctrine of equivalents was of extremely limited applicability. Judge Gajarsa observed that: “Not once has this court affirmed a decision finding noninfringement based on the reverse doctrine of equivalents.” Describing the doctrine an “an
anachronistic exception,” the court refused to apply or extend the reverse doctrine of equivalents.
3、應“正確的解釋申請專利範圍”。
小弟曾於某篇文章中看到地院依逆均等論判決不侵權，但卻被CAFC法官reverse，其認為地院的權利範圍解釋錯誤，應加入“其他限制條件”，只是忘了該文章出處，也忘了該判例名稱，有點可惜，目前正在尋找當中。不過，在此介紹一個“判例”，Multiform v. Medzam (Fed. Cir 1998)，有一點點相關：
Claim 1: A packet for absorbing and immobilizing a liquid comprising an envelope which is degradable in said liquid...
Specification:"...starch paper which is degradable in water and other liquids...dissolve..."
於此案例中，權利範圍使用“degradable”但於說明書中卻使用“dissolve”，雖然被告其製品已落入“degradable”的文義範圍，但是法官沒有依逆均等論進行判決，而認為要解釋一技術用語，最好的來源為說明書及申請專利過程檔案，而將“degradable”解釋成“dissolve”，限縮了不合理的權利範圍。
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/PDF/2004DLTR0010.pdf
In other words, properly construed claims of a traditional product should be specific enough that it should not read on the nanoproduct in the first instance.
其他..
1、於”summary judgment”，是不可適用逆均等論，因為其為“事實問題”而非“法律問題”。
The closest the court came was the in banc decision in SRI International v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of America, 775 F.2d 1107, 227 USPQ 577 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (in banc), which, in a 6-5 vote, reversed a summary judgment of noninfringement based on the reverse doctrine of equivalents, finding issues of fact and remanding for trial on the issue.
2、適用方式：
http://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/reverse-doctrine-of-equivalents.html
How Does the Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents Work?
In determining whether or not to use the reverse doctrine of equivalents, a court will consider several factors:
What is the actual scope of the patent? Does it cover the new invention?
If so, should that patent extend to the new invention? This is the major issue that the reverse doctrine of equivalents must address. What is the fair scope of the patent?
Has the new invention sufficiently transformed the original invention such that it should fall outside the scope of the patent of the original invention?
參考文章如下：
一、 日本網站找到的文章：「An Analysis of Trends in the Construction of U.S. Patent Claims: 1997-2002」第24頁
http://www.iip.or.jp/summary/pdf/thomas.PDF
二、專利侵害鑑定要點草案
http://www.tipo.gov.tw/attachment/tempUpload/81786957/專利侵害鑑定要點草案.doc
三、Intellectual propert_Patent Law Course Materials.pdf
Professor Wagner
連結：一整本電子書
四、自己整理過的blog。
http://patentdic.blogspot.com/2006/02/claimcafc.html
五、PROTECTING THE NEXT SMALL THING: NANOTECHNOLOGY AND THE REVERSE
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
此篇奈米領域的專利工程師可以讀一讀。權利要求用“微小”時，某一段範圍的數值，會不會被依“逆均等論”不侵害？
11/22/2006
申請專利範圍的解釋
【請求項】申請專利範圍的解釋
Johnson Worldwide v. Zebco175 F.3d 985 (Fed. Cir. 1999)Before MAYER, Chief Judge, CLEVENGER, and GAJARSA, Circuit Judges.
We begin, as with all claim interpretation analyses, with the language of the claims. . . . The general rule is, of course, that terms in the claim are to be given their ordinary and accustomed meaning. . . . General descriptive terms will ordinarily be given their full meaning; modifiers will not be added to broad terms standing alone. See, e.g., Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 865-66, 45 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1225, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unmodified term "reciprocating" not limited to linear reciprocation); Bell Communications, 55 F.3d at 621-22, 34 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) at 1821 (unmodified term "associating" not limited to explicit association); Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 987, 6 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1601, 1606 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (unmodified term "plasticizer" given full range of ordinary and accustomed meaning). In short, a court must presume that the terms in the claim mean what they say, and, unless otherwise compelled, give full effect to the ordinary and accustomed meaning of claim terms. . . .
解釋申請專利範圍的通用規則是：請求項中的用語必須是一般及慣常的意思。但是在下列兩種情況下，必須將它解釋成其他意思。
Our case law demonstrates two situations where a sufficient reason exists to require the entry of a definition of a claim term other than its ordinary and accustomed meaning. The first arises if the patentee has chosen to be his or her own lexicographer by clearly setting forth an explicit definition for a claim term. . . . . The second is where the term or terms chosen by the patentee so deprive the claim of clarity that there is no means by which the scope of the claim may be ascertained from the language used. . . . . In these two circumstances, a term or terms used in the claim invites--or indeed, requires-- reference to intrinsic, or in some cases, extrinsic, evidence, see Vitronics (reference to extrinsic evidence is proper when intrinsic evidence cannot resolve ambiguity in claim language), to determine the scope of the claim language.
【請求項】申請專利範圍的解釋
【請求項】申請專利範圍的解釋
Vitronics v. Conceptronics90 F.3d 1576, 39 USPQ2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
Indeed, if "solder reflow temperature" were defined to mean liquidus temperature, a preferred (and indeed only) embodiment in the specification would not fall within the scope of the patent claim. Such an interpretation is rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support, which is wholly absent in this case.
解釋後的申請專利範圍，應該包含說明書的較佳實施例，如果不包含也應該要有具說服力的證據支持。
Vitronics v. Conceptronics90 F.3d 1576, 39 USPQ2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
Indeed, if "solder reflow temperature" were defined to mean liquidus temperature, a preferred (and indeed only) embodiment in the specification would not fall within the scope of the patent claim. Such an interpretation is rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support, which is wholly absent in this case.
解釋後的申請專利範圍，應該包含說明書的較佳實施例，如果不包含也應該要有具說服力的證據支持。
【請求項】多項制
【請求項】多項制
附屬項的範圍通常都被獨立項的範圍所包含，因此，專利說明書的請求項為何採用多項制？雖然採用“多項制”在目前的眼光下，幾乎是理所當然的，至於為什麼，這個問題小弟也幾乎懶得去想了。也對！因為想了理由又如何？不論有沒有答案，大家的作法都是一樣的，不過，今天看到一篇文章（事實上它是一本免費的電子書），覺得也許可以試著聽聽法官們怎麼解譯（他是一個“當時還是地方法官的“法官的opinion），順便整理一下我覺得有趣的幾段文字。
專利說明書內包含技術和法律兩個層面，所以要撰寫專利說明書是很困難的，而這種難處早在1892年就被最高法院的法官所承認的：
This land is even more fantastical when populated with patents, for a patent attempts to combine the particular challenges of a specialized field of technology with the separate challenges of a particularized field of law.
The Supreme Court recognized the difficulty of patent drafting over a century ago when it observed: The specification and claims of a patent, particularly if the invention be at all complicated, constitute one of the most difficult legal instruments to draw with accuracy. . . .
Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892).
另外，撰寫專利說明書內的“權利範圍”，它的難處可分成兩面來看：
However, claim breadth cuts both ways: a patent applicant must keep its claims sufficiently narrow to avoid sweeping in the prior art, but sufficiently broad to encompass the accused devices or processes. Often, the applicant must do this before it is aware of all the relevant prior art and before the accused device even exists.
就是因為這個原因，專利的權利範圍，適合採用“多項制”。
In his usual style, then-District Judge Hand discussed the practice of differentiating an invention from the prior artby drafting claims of varying breadth:
There is nothing improper, so far as I can see, in first putting your claims as broadly as in good faith you can, and then, ex abundanti cautela, following them successively with narrower claims designed to protect you against possible anticipations of which you are not yet aware. Indeed, the very case upon which the defendant relies (Matheson v. Campbell, 78 Fed. 910, 917, 24 C.C.A. 384) shows the necessity of claims as broad as one can honestly support.
附屬項的範圍通常都被獨立項的範圍所包含，因此，專利說明書的請求項為何採用多項制？雖然採用“多項制”在目前的眼光下，幾乎是理所當然的，至於為什麼，這個問題小弟也幾乎懶得去想了。也對！因為想了理由又如何？不論有沒有答案，大家的作法都是一樣的，不過，今天看到一篇文章（事實上它是一本免費的電子書），覺得也許可以試著聽聽法官們怎麼解譯（他是一個“當時還是地方法官的“法官的opinion），順便整理一下我覺得有趣的幾段文字。
專利說明書內包含技術和法律兩個層面，所以要撰寫專利說明書是很困難的，而這種難處早在1892年就被最高法院的法官所承認的：
This land is even more fantastical when populated with patents, for a patent attempts to combine the particular challenges of a specialized field of technology with the separate challenges of a particularized field of law.
The Supreme Court recognized the difficulty of patent drafting over a century ago when it observed: The specification and claims of a patent, particularly if the invention be at all complicated, constitute one of the most difficult legal instruments to draw with accuracy. . . .
Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892).
另外，撰寫專利說明書內的“權利範圍”，它的難處可分成兩面來看：
However, claim breadth cuts both ways: a patent applicant must keep its claims sufficiently narrow to avoid sweeping in the prior art, but sufficiently broad to encompass the accused devices or processes. Often, the applicant must do this before it is aware of all the relevant prior art and before the accused device even exists.
就是因為這個原因，專利的權利範圍，適合採用“多項制”。
In his usual style, then-District Judge Hand discussed the practice of differentiating an invention from the prior artby drafting claims of varying breadth:
There is nothing improper, so far as I can see, in first putting your claims as broadly as in good faith you can, and then, ex abundanti cautela, following them successively with narrower claims designed to protect you against possible anticipations of which you are not yet aware. Indeed, the very case upon which the defendant relies (Matheson v. Campbell, 78 Fed. 910, 917, 24 C.C.A. 384) shows the necessity of claims as broad as one can honestly support.
2/08/2006
【Claim】說明書中的限制條件是否應讀進申請專利範圍
【Claim】說明書中的限制條件是否應讀進申請專利範圍
RENISHAW PLC v MARPOSS SOCIETA' PER AZIONI, ET AL.
要了解申請專利範圍的解譯這是一個很重要的判例，我覺得，它主要是探討是不是應將說明書中的限制條件，讀進申請專利範圍來限制權利範圍的情形。
Renishaw, of course, alludes to a familiar pair of claim construction canons: (a) one may not read a limitation into a claim from the written description, but (b) one may look to the written description to define a term already in a claim limitation, for a claim must be read in view of the specification of which it is a part. These two rules lay out the general relationship between the claims and the written description. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc. , 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 USPQ2d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. , 52 F.3d 967, 979-80, 34 USPQ2d 1321, 1329-30 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), aff'd , 517 U.S. 370, 38 USPQ2d 1461 (1996). As rules at the core of claim construction methodology, they provide guideposts for a spectrum of claim construction problems.
Although no canon of construction is absolute in its application, these two rules share two underlying propositions. First, it is manifest that a claim must explicitly recite a term in need of definition before a definition may enter the claim from the written description. This is so because the claims define the scope of the right to exclude; the claim construction inquiry, therefore, begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of the claim, see AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp. , 122 F.3d 1019, 1023, 43 USPQ2d 1545, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[T]he language of the claim frames and ultimately resolves all issues of claim interpretation."); Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp. , 55 F.3d 615, 619-20, 34 USPQ2d 1816, 1819 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The intrinsic evidence, and, in some cases, the extrinsic evidence, can shed light on the meaning of the terms recited in a claim, either by confirming the ordinary meaning of the claim terms or by providing special meaning for claim terms. See Vitronics , 90 F.3d at 1583, 39 USPQ2d at 1577. However, the resulting claim interpretation must, in the end, accord with the words chosen by the patentee to stake out the boundary of the claimed property. See Thermalloy, Inc. v. Aavid Eng'g, Inc. , 121 F.3d 691, 693, 43 USPQ2d 1846, 1848 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[T]hroughout the interpretation process, the focus remains on the meaning of claim language.").
Thus, a party wishing to use statements in the written description to confine or otherwise affect a patent's scope must, at the very least, point to a term or terms in the claim with which to draw in those statements. Without any claim term that is susceptible of clarification by the written description, there is no legitimate way to narrow the property right. The Supreme Court has clearly stated the rationale for this requirement:
[W]e know of no principle of law which would authorize us to read into a claim an element which is not present, for the purpose of making out a case of novelty or infringement. The difficulty is that if we once begin to include elements not mentioned in the claim in order to limit such claim . . ., we should never know where to stop.
McCarty v. Lehigh Valley R.R. , 160 U.S. 110, 116 (1895). If we need not rely on a limitation to interpret what the patentee meant by a particular term or phrase in a claim, that limitation is "extraneous" and cannot constrain the claim. See Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc. , 9 F.3d 948, 950, 28 USPQ2d 1936, 1938 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("It is improper for a court to add 'extraneous' limitations to a claim, that is, limitations added wholly apart from any need to interpret what the patentee meant by particular words or phrases in the claim." (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. , 849 F.2d 1430, 1433, 7 USPQ2d 1129, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp. , 845 F.2d 981, 987, 6 USPQ2d 1601, 1605 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Where a specification does not require a limitation, that limitation should not be read from the specification into the claims." (citing Lemelson v. United States , 752 F.2d 1538, 1551- 52, 224 USPQ 526, 534 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); cf. Constant v. Advanced Micro- Devices, Inc. , 848 F.2d 1560, 1571, 7 USPQ2d 1057, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that the written description provided "no evidence to indicate that [] limitations must be imported into the claims to give meaning to disputed terms").
The other clear point provided by these two canons covers the situation in which a patent applicant has elected to be a lexicographer by providing an explicit definition in the specification for a claim term. In such a case, the definition selected by the patent applicant controls. The patentee's lexicography must, of course, appear "with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision" before it can affect the claim. In re Paulsen , 30 F.3d 1475, 1480, 31 USPQ2d 1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc. , 952 F.2d 1384, 1388, 21 USPQ2d 1383, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1992). If the patentee provides such a clear definition, the two canons require reference to the written description, because only there is the claim term defined as it is used by the patentee. The law provides a patentee with this opportunity because the public may not be schooled in the terminology of the technical art or there may not be an extant term of singular meaning for the structure or concept that is being claimed. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp. , 733 F.2d 881, 889, 221 USPQ 1025, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Absent a special and particular definition created by the patent applicant, terms in a claim are to be given their ordinary and accustomed meaning. See York Prods., Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Ctr. , 99 F.3d 1568, 1572, 40 USPQ2d 1619, 1622 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Without an express intent to impart a novel meaning to claim terms, an inventor's claim terms take on their ordinary meaning."); Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., Inc. , 15 F.3d 1573, 1577, 27 USPQ2d 1836, 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Thus, when a claim term is expressed in general descriptive words, we will not ordinarily limit the term to a numerical range that may appear in the written description or in other claims. See Modine Mfg. , 75 F.3d at 1551, 37 USPQ2d at 1612. Nor may we, in the broader situation, add a narrowing modifier before an otherwise general term that stands unmodified in a claim. See, e.g. , Bell Communications , 55 F.3d at 621-22, 34 USPQ2d at 1821 (faulting the district court for interpreting claim term "associating" to cover only explicit, and not implicit, association); Specialty Composites , 845 F.2d at 986-87, 6 USPQ2d at 1604 (refusing to limit the recited claim term "plasticizer" to external plasticizers where skilled artisans used the term broadly). For example, if an apparatus claim recites a general structure ( e.g. , a noun) without limiting that structure to a specific subset of structures ( e.g. , with an adjective), we will generally construe the claim to cover all known types of that structure that are supported by the patent disclosure. See, e.g. , Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co. , 133 F.3d 860, 865-66, 45 USPQ2d 1225, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (claim term "reciprocating" is given its ordinary meaning and not limited to mere linear reciprocation); Sjolund v. Musland , 847 F.2d 1573, 1581-82, 6 USPQ2d 2020, 2027 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (refusing to limit claim term "baffle" to only rigid baffles and term "panel" to only panels of lattice construction).
However, a common meaning, such as one expressed in a relevant dictionary, that flies in the face of the patent disclosure is undeserving of fealty. As one of our predecessor courts stated in Liebscher v. Boothroyd , 258 F.2d 948 (CCPA 1958):
Indiscriminate reliance on definitions found in dictionaries can often produce absurd results. . . . One need not arbitrarily pick and choose from the various accepted definitions of a word to decide which meaning was intended as the word is used in a given claim. The subject matter, the context, etc., will more often than not lead to the correct conclusion.
Id. at 951; see Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc. , 149 F.3d 1335, ___, 47 USPQ2d 1418, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Intel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n , 946 F.2d 821, 836, 20 USPQ2d 1161, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (affirming construction of "permanent" as a relative term in light of the patent disclosure); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc. , 776 F.2d 281, 298, 227 USPQ 657, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (claim limitation requiring that a process be carried out "under substantially anhydrous conditions with the removal of water above 100° C" covered only continuous removal of water, because the written description stated that failure to remove water continously would adversely affect the process). Thus, where there are several common meanings for a claim term, the patent disclosure serves to point away from the improper meanings and toward the proper meaning.
Ultimately, the interpretation to be given a term can only be determined and confirmed with a full understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to envelop with the claim. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. , 517 U.S. 370, 389 , 38 USPQ2d 1461, 1470 (1996). The construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent's description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction. See Young Dental , 112 F.3d at 1142, 42 USPQ2d at 1593 (affirming the district court's claim construction as "a more natural reading of the claim language" than the appellant's construction); cf. Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 401 ("Plainly, to make any canon take hold in a particular instance, the construction contended for must be sold, essentially, by means other than the use of the canon: The good sense of the situation and a simple construction of the available language to achieve that sense, by tenable means, out of the statutory language ."). A claim construction is persuasive, not because it follows a certain rule, but because it defines terms in the context of the whole patent.
【摘錄】Thus, a party wishing to use statements in the written description to confine or otherwise affect a patent's scope must, at the very least, point to a term or terms in the claim with which to draw in those statements.
參考：舊blog。
RENISHAW PLC v MARPOSS SOCIETA' PER AZIONI, ET AL.
要了解申請專利範圍的解譯這是一個很重要的判例，我覺得，它主要是探討是不是應將說明書中的限制條件，讀進申請專利範圍來限制權利範圍的情形。
Renishaw, of course, alludes to a familiar pair of claim construction canons: (a) one may not read a limitation into a claim from the written description, but (b) one may look to the written description to define a term already in a claim limitation, for a claim must be read in view of the specification of which it is a part. These two rules lay out the general relationship between the claims and the written description. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc. , 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 USPQ2d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. , 52 F.3d 967, 979-80, 34 USPQ2d 1321, 1329-30 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), aff'd , 517 U.S. 370, 38 USPQ2d 1461 (1996). As rules at the core of claim construction methodology, they provide guideposts for a spectrum of claim construction problems.
Although no canon of construction is absolute in its application, these two rules share two underlying propositions. First, it is manifest that a claim must explicitly recite a term in need of definition before a definition may enter the claim from the written description. This is so because the claims define the scope of the right to exclude; the claim construction inquiry, therefore, begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of the claim, see AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp. , 122 F.3d 1019, 1023, 43 USPQ2d 1545, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[T]he language of the claim frames and ultimately resolves all issues of claim interpretation."); Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp. , 55 F.3d 615, 619-20, 34 USPQ2d 1816, 1819 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The intrinsic evidence, and, in some cases, the extrinsic evidence, can shed light on the meaning of the terms recited in a claim, either by confirming the ordinary meaning of the claim terms or by providing special meaning for claim terms. See Vitronics , 90 F.3d at 1583, 39 USPQ2d at 1577. However, the resulting claim interpretation must, in the end, accord with the words chosen by the patentee to stake out the boundary of the claimed property. See Thermalloy, Inc. v. Aavid Eng'g, Inc. , 121 F.3d 691, 693, 43 USPQ2d 1846, 1848 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[T]hroughout the interpretation process, the focus remains on the meaning of claim language.").
Thus, a party wishing to use statements in the written description to confine or otherwise affect a patent's scope must, at the very least, point to a term or terms in the claim with which to draw in those statements. Without any claim term that is susceptible of clarification by the written description, there is no legitimate way to narrow the property right. The Supreme Court has clearly stated the rationale for this requirement:
[W]e know of no principle of law which would authorize us to read into a claim an element which is not present, for the purpose of making out a case of novelty or infringement. The difficulty is that if we once begin to include elements not mentioned in the claim in order to limit such claim . . ., we should never know where to stop.
McCarty v. Lehigh Valley R.R. , 160 U.S. 110, 116 (1895). If we need not rely on a limitation to interpret what the patentee meant by a particular term or phrase in a claim, that limitation is "extraneous" and cannot constrain the claim. See Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc. , 9 F.3d 948, 950, 28 USPQ2d 1936, 1938 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("It is improper for a court to add 'extraneous' limitations to a claim, that is, limitations added wholly apart from any need to interpret what the patentee meant by particular words or phrases in the claim." (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. , 849 F.2d 1430, 1433, 7 USPQ2d 1129, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp. , 845 F.2d 981, 987, 6 USPQ2d 1601, 1605 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Where a specification does not require a limitation, that limitation should not be read from the specification into the claims." (citing Lemelson v. United States , 752 F.2d 1538, 1551- 52, 224 USPQ 526, 534 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); cf. Constant v. Advanced Micro- Devices, Inc. , 848 F.2d 1560, 1571, 7 USPQ2d 1057, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that the written description provided "no evidence to indicate that [] limitations must be imported into the claims to give meaning to disputed terms").
The other clear point provided by these two canons covers the situation in which a patent applicant has elected to be a lexicographer by providing an explicit definition in the specification for a claim term. In such a case, the definition selected by the patent applicant controls. The patentee's lexicography must, of course, appear "with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision" before it can affect the claim. In re Paulsen , 30 F.3d 1475, 1480, 31 USPQ2d 1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc. , 952 F.2d 1384, 1388, 21 USPQ2d 1383, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1992). If the patentee provides such a clear definition, the two canons require reference to the written description, because only there is the claim term defined as it is used by the patentee. The law provides a patentee with this opportunity because the public may not be schooled in the terminology of the technical art or there may not be an extant term of singular meaning for the structure or concept that is being claimed. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp. , 733 F.2d 881, 889, 221 USPQ 1025, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Absent a special and particular definition created by the patent applicant, terms in a claim are to be given their ordinary and accustomed meaning. See York Prods., Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Ctr. , 99 F.3d 1568, 1572, 40 USPQ2d 1619, 1622 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Without an express intent to impart a novel meaning to claim terms, an inventor's claim terms take on their ordinary meaning."); Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., Inc. , 15 F.3d 1573, 1577, 27 USPQ2d 1836, 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Thus, when a claim term is expressed in general descriptive words, we will not ordinarily limit the term to a numerical range that may appear in the written description or in other claims. See Modine Mfg. , 75 F.3d at 1551, 37 USPQ2d at 1612. Nor may we, in the broader situation, add a narrowing modifier before an otherwise general term that stands unmodified in a claim. See, e.g. , Bell Communications , 55 F.3d at 621-22, 34 USPQ2d at 1821 (faulting the district court for interpreting claim term "associating" to cover only explicit, and not implicit, association); Specialty Composites , 845 F.2d at 986-87, 6 USPQ2d at 1604 (refusing to limit the recited claim term "plasticizer" to external plasticizers where skilled artisans used the term broadly). For example, if an apparatus claim recites a general structure ( e.g. , a noun) without limiting that structure to a specific subset of structures ( e.g. , with an adjective), we will generally construe the claim to cover all known types of that structure that are supported by the patent disclosure. See, e.g. , Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co. , 133 F.3d 860, 865-66, 45 USPQ2d 1225, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (claim term "reciprocating" is given its ordinary meaning and not limited to mere linear reciprocation); Sjolund v. Musland , 847 F.2d 1573, 1581-82, 6 USPQ2d 2020, 2027 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (refusing to limit claim term "baffle" to only rigid baffles and term "panel" to only panels of lattice construction).
However, a common meaning, such as one expressed in a relevant dictionary, that flies in the face of the patent disclosure is undeserving of fealty. As one of our predecessor courts stated in Liebscher v. Boothroyd , 258 F.2d 948 (CCPA 1958):
Indiscriminate reliance on definitions found in dictionaries can often produce absurd results. . . . One need not arbitrarily pick and choose from the various accepted definitions of a word to decide which meaning was intended as the word is used in a given claim. The subject matter, the context, etc., will more often than not lead to the correct conclusion.
Id. at 951; see Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc. , 149 F.3d 1335, ___, 47 USPQ2d 1418, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Intel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n , 946 F.2d 821, 836, 20 USPQ2d 1161, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (affirming construction of "permanent" as a relative term in light of the patent disclosure); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc. , 776 F.2d 281, 298, 227 USPQ 657, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (claim limitation requiring that a process be carried out "under substantially anhydrous conditions with the removal of water above 100° C" covered only continuous removal of water, because the written description stated that failure to remove water continously would adversely affect the process). Thus, where there are several common meanings for a claim term, the patent disclosure serves to point away from the improper meanings and toward the proper meaning.
Ultimately, the interpretation to be given a term can only be determined and confirmed with a full understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to envelop with the claim. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. , 517 U.S. 370, 389 , 38 USPQ2d 1461, 1470 (1996). The construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent's description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction. See Young Dental , 112 F.3d at 1142, 42 USPQ2d at 1593 (affirming the district court's claim construction as "a more natural reading of the claim language" than the appellant's construction); cf. Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 401 ("Plainly, to make any canon take hold in a particular instance, the construction contended for must be sold, essentially, by means other than the use of the canon: The good sense of the situation and a simple construction of the available language to achieve that sense, by tenable means, out of the statutory language ."). A claim construction is persuasive, not because it follows a certain rule, but because it defines terms in the context of the whole patent.
【摘錄】Thus, a party wishing to use statements in the written description to confine or otherwise affect a patent's scope must, at the very least, point to a term or terms in the claim with which to draw in those statements.
翻譯一：當事人想要用書面記載中的陳述，來限制申請專利範圍；或者不然，而是想要用來影響申請專利範圍，則必須至少指出申請專利範圍中的用語；以及於該些陳述中使用該些用語來進行描述。
翻譯二：當事人想要用書面記載中的陳述，來限制申請專利範圍；或者不然，而是想要用來影響申請專利範圍，則必須至少指出申請專利範圍中的用語；以及導出其定義的說明間的關係。
參考：舊blog。
1/24/2006
【摘錄】請求項較寬解釋和較窄解釋間的抉擇
【摘錄】請求項較寬解釋和較窄解釋間的抉擇
參見：google的備份及我的備份
Were we to allow [Athletic Alternatives Inc.] successfully to assert the broader of the two senses of ``between'` against Prince, we would undermine the fair notice function of the requirement that the patentee distinctly claim the subject matter disclosed in the patent from which he can exclude others temporarily. Where there is an equal choice between a broader and a narrower meaning of a claim, and there is an enabling disclosure that indicates that the applicant is at least entitled to a claim having the narrower meaning, we consider the notice function of the claim to be best served by adopting the narrower meaning.
請求項的意思在較寬解釋和較窄解釋間具有相等的選擇機會，且可實施要件的開示亦顯示申請人至少能夠獲准具較窄意思的請求項時，我們認為採用較窄意思最能夠發揮申請專利範圍的公示機能。
PS：給自己的期望，每日挑選一句判例的文字翻譯，但或許這樣太嚴苛了，不過，至少每星期一句，好吧也許是一個月。
參見：google的備份及我的備份
Were we to allow [Athletic Alternatives Inc.] successfully to assert the broader of the two senses of ``between'` against Prince, we would undermine the fair notice function of the requirement that the patentee distinctly claim the subject matter disclosed in the patent from which he can exclude others temporarily. Where there is an equal choice between a broader and a narrower meaning of a claim, and there is an enabling disclosure that indicates that the applicant is at least entitled to a claim having the narrower meaning, we consider the notice function of the claim to be best served by adopting the narrower meaning.
請求項的意思在較寬解釋和較窄解釋間具有相等的選擇機會，且可實施要件的開示亦顯示申請人至少能夠獲准具較窄意思的請求項時，我們認為採用較窄意思最能夠發揮申請專利範圍的公示機能。
PS：給自己的期望，每日挑選一句判例的文字翻譯，但或許這樣太嚴苛了，不過，至少每星期一句，好吧也許是一個月。
9/14/2005
Why element-by-element inquiry ?
出自中國的一篇文章：
How to interpret a patent claim is a key issue in deciding whether an infringement of the patent occurred there. When the Federal Circuit decided Hilton Davis Chemical Co., v. Warner Jenkinson Co., 62 F. 3d 1512, (Fed. Cir. 1995), it used "insubstantial difference" test to decide whether the accused product or process infringed the patented product or process. That is, if the accused product or process as a whole is the same one as the product or process covered by the patent, there is an infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, otherwise there is no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. However, this is more close to the central claiming principle in interpretation of a patent claim, which is contrary to the peripheral claiming principle used by U. S. courts for a long period.
As a whole下適用均等論的話，較接近中心限定主義。然而這與美國法院長期使用之周邊限定主義衝突。
How to interpret a patent claim is a key issue in deciding whether an infringement of the patent occurred there. When the Federal Circuit decided Hilton Davis Chemical Co., v. Warner Jenkinson Co., 62 F. 3d 1512, (Fed. Cir. 1995), it used "insubstantial difference" test to decide whether the accused product or process infringed the patented product or process. That is, if the accused product or process as a whole is the same one as the product or process covered by the patent, there is an infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, otherwise there is no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. However, this is more close to the central claiming principle in interpretation of a patent claim, which is contrary to the peripheral claiming principle used by U. S. courts for a long period.
As a whole下適用均等論的話，較接近中心限定主義。然而這與美國法院長期使用之周邊限定主義衝突。
9/12/2005
什麼叫「All element rule」？（三）以及「必要」是“非必要”（二）
以這一篇文章「One Plus One Can Equal One – In Patent Law」，作為這一整個主題的結束。
One major principle stressed by the Court is adherence to the “all-elements” rule, requiring just the determination of equivalency proceed on an element-by-element inquiry, rather than comparing the overall similarity of the accused device as a whole to the claims. This is to ensure that the application of the doctrine, even as to an individual element, is not allowed such broad play as to effectively eliminate that element in its entirety. When applying the test, the Court said, “[a] focus on individual elements and a special vigilance against allowing the concept of equivalence to eliminate completely any such elements should reduce considerably the imprecision of whatever language is used.”
“element-by-element inquiry”是為了防止專利權人擴大均等論的適用，有效地刪除一個元件主張均等論。
Does this mean that when an accused device entirely lacks an element, one gets away with it no matter how similar the device is to the claims in other respects?
接著看有名的Festo案子，這案子常聽到，第一次看到它還有這個爭點，先前還一直再找有關利用均等論，來有效刪去 claim中無效“非必要”元件的判例，原來“遠在天邊近在眼前”，從很多人口中聽到這個案子，卻沒有聽到這爭點。
Instead, the accused infringer argued that because its two-way sealing ring was only one element, it did not meet the doctrine of equivalents requirement of the “all-elements” rule, and so was summarily not equivalent to the pair of rings in the patent claim. The court decided against the infringer and held that the accused device was not required to have all the components of the claimed invention for the device to infringe. Did this violate the “all elements” rule? Not so, said the court, “this rule does not require a one-to-one correspondence of components.”
侵權人爭論他的元件只有一個，而請求項卻說有兩個，因此不符合“all-elements” rule，不適用均等論，必竟均等論要 element-by-element inquiry 對吧。法院卻認為「this rule does not require a one-to-one correspondence of components」。所以二個也可以等於一個。
這一篇文章真的很值得讀，解開了我很多的疑惑。接下來，看看作者怎麼解說“element”和“limitation”：
After this, one is tempted to look at elements and limitations in three different ways. First, a limitation is an element, in which case, the doctrine collapses into nothing more than a literal infringement test. Second, a limitation is not essential to an element; therefore so long as the process recited a pH step, there would be infringement. Third, a limitation may be essential to defining the element, in which case evidence is required in order to determine whether a person skilled in the art would have known of the limitation’s functional interchangeability with the one in the claims.
Never one to make bold statements, the Federal Circuit opted for the third choice which, after all, was the proper choice. At least, it is preferable to sleightful wordplay.
看到這個字「sleightful wordplay」，讓我不覺莞爾。
One major principle stressed by the Court is adherence to the “all-elements” rule, requiring just the determination of equivalency proceed on an element-by-element inquiry, rather than comparing the overall similarity of the accused device as a whole to the claims. This is to ensure that the application of the doctrine, even as to an individual element, is not allowed such broad play as to effectively eliminate that element in its entirety. When applying the test, the Court said, “[a] focus on individual elements and a special vigilance against allowing the concept of equivalence to eliminate completely any such elements should reduce considerably the imprecision of whatever language is used.”
“element-by-element inquiry”是為了防止專利權人擴大均等論的適用，有效地刪除一個元件主張均等論。
Does this mean that when an accused device entirely lacks an element, one gets away with it no matter how similar the device is to the claims in other respects?
接著看有名的Festo案子，這案子常聽到，第一次看到它還有這個爭點，先前還一直再找有關利用均等論，來有效刪去 claim中無效“非必要”元件的判例，原來“遠在天邊近在眼前”，從很多人口中聽到這個案子，卻沒有聽到這爭點。
Instead, the accused infringer argued that because its two-way sealing ring was only one element, it did not meet the doctrine of equivalents requirement of the “all-elements” rule, and so was summarily not equivalent to the pair of rings in the patent claim. The court decided against the infringer and held that the accused device was not required to have all the components of the claimed invention for the device to infringe. Did this violate the “all elements” rule? Not so, said the court, “this rule does not require a one-to-one correspondence of components.”
侵權人爭論他的元件只有一個，而請求項卻說有兩個，因此不符合“all-elements” rule，不適用均等論，必竟均等論要 element-by-element inquiry 對吧。法院卻認為「this rule does not require a one-to-one correspondence of components」。所以二個也可以等於一個。
這一篇文章真的很值得讀，解開了我很多的疑惑。接下來，看看作者怎麼解說“element”和“limitation”：
After this, one is tempted to look at elements and limitations in three different ways. First, a limitation is an element, in which case, the doctrine collapses into nothing more than a literal infringement test. Second, a limitation is not essential to an element; therefore so long as the process recited a pH step, there would be infringement. Third, a limitation may be essential to defining the element, in which case evidence is required in order to determine whether a person skilled in the art would have known of the limitation’s functional interchangeability with the one in the claims.
Never one to make bold statements, the Federal Circuit opted for the third choice which, after all, was the proper choice. At least, it is preferable to sleightful wordplay.
看到這個字「sleightful wordplay」，讓我不覺莞爾。
原來還有人主張「必要」是“非必要”的
常常和同事吵“必要”和“非必要”，今天看到這篇文章，覺得還真是有趣，而且“感到興奮”，自己所支持的想法得到了支持。
來自於這一篇文章（按一下）：
Infringement analysis
In respect of the comparison of an alleged infringing product or process with the patent as claimed, a principle reminiscent of the all-element rule applies in which all the essential elements as recited in the claim need to be found therein. A principle similar to the doctrine of equivalents is also proposed whereby a claim that does not literally read on an alleged infringing product or process may still be found to be infringed if equivalent technical features are found therein upon analysis.
However there is also an important new concept in infringement analysis under the suggested principle of "unnecessary recitation" in which elements or limitations explicitly recited in an independent claim may be deleted by the court if they are viewed as obvious and redundant features that do not contribute to the essential function of the claimed product or processes. In evaluating whether a feature is "redundant", Part 50 of the guideline suggests the following consideration:
Is the feature under consideration one that distinguishes the claimed invention from prior art products as of the priority date, that is, whether the deletion of the feature under consideration would render the claim lacking in novelty or inventiveness as compared to the prior art;
whether the feature under consideration is essential for the functioning of the invention to achieve the solution of the technical problem to be solved; and
whether the technical feature under consideration falls under the principle of prosecution history estoppel.
The guideline further states that the court should not apply this principle of unnecessary recitation according to its own initiative, but rather apply it based on evidence produced by the plaintiff and by application thereof. Parts 50 and 53, however, caution that the application of this doctrine is more suitable for invention patent rights and should not be applied to the infringement analysis of utility models with relatively low inventiveness.
法院不應自行開啟適用“非必要”元件的主張，而且也不適用“新型”專利，因為新型專利的進步性考量較低。
Although this guideline contains a suggestion that may render claim scope uncertain and ambiguous, such a detailed suggestion is a step in the right direction towards in-depth infringement analysis. Time will tell whether these proposed principles will be adopted on a broader basis and whether the uncertainties introduced will be reconsidered and removed as the judicial development progresses.
「render claim scope uncertain and ambiguous」是非必要主張的缺點，不過把它捨棄的話似乎不合“公平”，我覺得如果給它比“均等論”更嚴格的適用條件，對“不懂專利”的個人發明人而言，應該是一個保障。
來自於這一篇文章（按一下）：
Infringement analysis
In respect of the comparison of an alleged infringing product or process with the patent as claimed, a principle reminiscent of the all-element rule applies in which all the essential elements as recited in the claim need to be found therein. A principle similar to the doctrine of equivalents is also proposed whereby a claim that does not literally read on an alleged infringing product or process may still be found to be infringed if equivalent technical features are found therein upon analysis.
However there is also an important new concept in infringement analysis under the suggested principle of "unnecessary recitation" in which elements or limitations explicitly recited in an independent claim may be deleted by the court if they are viewed as obvious and redundant features that do not contribute to the essential function of the claimed product or processes. In evaluating whether a feature is "redundant", Part 50 of the guideline suggests the following consideration:
Is the feature under consideration one that distinguishes the claimed invention from prior art products as of the priority date, that is, whether the deletion of the feature under consideration would render the claim lacking in novelty or inventiveness as compared to the prior art;
whether the feature under consideration is essential for the functioning of the invention to achieve the solution of the technical problem to be solved; and
whether the technical feature under consideration falls under the principle of prosecution history estoppel.
The guideline further states that the court should not apply this principle of unnecessary recitation according to its own initiative, but rather apply it based on evidence produced by the plaintiff and by application thereof. Parts 50 and 53, however, caution that the application of this doctrine is more suitable for invention patent rights and should not be applied to the infringement analysis of utility models with relatively low inventiveness.
法院不應自行開啟適用“非必要”元件的主張，而且也不適用“新型”專利，因為新型專利的進步性考量較低。
Although this guideline contains a suggestion that may render claim scope uncertain and ambiguous, such a detailed suggestion is a step in the right direction towards in-depth infringement analysis. Time will tell whether these proposed principles will be adopted on a broader basis and whether the uncertainties introduced will be reconsidered and removed as the judicial development progresses.
「render claim scope uncertain and ambiguous」是非必要主張的缺點，不過把它捨棄的話似乎不合“公平”，我覺得如果給它比“均等論”更嚴格的適用條件，對“不懂專利”的個人發明人而言，應該是一個保障。
9/11/2005
什麼叫「All element rule」？（二）
先參見之前的文章什麼叫「All element rule」，整理這一篇是希望能夠了解，什麼叫“element”？什麼叫“limitation”？看完之後，我還不是很了解這兩個字的意思。
In Aquatex v Techniche Solutions (CAFC 05-1088)
However, “[t]he doctrine of equivalents allows the patentee to claim those insubstantial alterations that were not captured in drafting the original patent claim but which could be created through trivial changes.” Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733 (2002) (“Festo II”). Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents requires that the accused product contain each limitation of the claim or its equivalent. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997). An element in the accused product is equivalent to a claim limitation if the differences between the two are insubstantial. The analysis focuses on whether the element in the accused device “performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result” as the claim limitation. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (internal quotation omitted).
Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents requires that the accused product contain each limitation of the claim or its equivalent.
均等論下的侵權，需要被控物含有claim的每個limitation或它的均等物。（這是「All element rule」嗎？我覺得應該不是，應稱為「All limitation rule」。）
另外特別留意英文用字：「An element in the accused product」、「a claim limitation」。因此 element 指的是被控物；而 limitation 指的是 claim，這兩個字應先稿清楚。（PS：這樣的解譯是對的嗎？）
我的心得：見山是山，見山不是山。搞清楚一個“字”的意思，才是一切的「 根蒂」。繼續研究什麼叫「All element rule」。
In Aquatex v Techniche Solutions (CAFC 05-1088)
However, “[t]he doctrine of equivalents allows the patentee to claim those insubstantial alterations that were not captured in drafting the original patent claim but which could be created through trivial changes.” Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733 (2002) (“Festo II”). Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents requires that the accused product contain each limitation of the claim or its equivalent. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997). An element in the accused product is equivalent to a claim limitation if the differences between the two are insubstantial. The analysis focuses on whether the element in the accused device “performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result” as the claim limitation. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (internal quotation omitted).
Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents requires that the accused product contain each limitation of the claim or its equivalent.
均等論下的侵權，需要被控物含有claim的每個limitation或它的均等物。（這是「All element rule」嗎？我覺得應該不是，應稱為「All limitation rule」。）
另外特別留意英文用字：「An element in the accused product」、「a claim limitation」。因此 element 指的是被控物；而 limitation 指的是 claim，這兩個字應先稿清楚。（PS：這樣的解譯是對的嗎？）
我的心得：見山是山，見山不是山。搞清楚一個“字”的意思，才是一切的「 根蒂」。繼續研究什麼叫「All element rule」。
檔案歷史禁反言的適用範圍
檔案歷史禁反言的適用範圍
In Aquatex v Techniche Solutions (CAFC 05-1088)
Prosecution history estoppel can prevent a patentee from relying on the doctrine of equivalents when the patentee relinquishes subject matter during the prosecution of the patent, either by amendment or argument. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 1999). “The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel limits the doctrine of equivalents when an applicant makes a narrowing amendment for purposes of patentability, or clearly and unmistakably surrenders subject matter by arguments made to an examiner.” Salazar, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13517, at *6; see Festo II, 535 U.S. at 736 (narrowing amendment for purposes of patentability); Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow Communication Labs., Inc., 305 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (argument-based estoppel).
曾經見過“argument-based estoppel”？我好像看過又好像沒有看過，就算是看過也不知道它是什麼意思，現在終於知道了。
不 僅 amendment 會適用禁反言，連 argument 也會而以 argument 適用禁反言的就叫做“argument-based estoppel”。但是要適用“argument-based estoppel”，檔案歷史就必須“ evince（顯示出） a clear and unmistakable surrender of subject matter.”，因此模擬兩可的話就不能適用。
To invoke argument-based estoppel, the prosecution history “must evince a clear and unmistakable surrender of subject matter.” Pharmacia, 170 F.3d at 1377 (internal quotation omitted). To determine if subject matter has been relinquished, an objective test is applied, inquiring “whether a competitor would reasonably believe that the applicant had surrendered the relevant subject matter.” Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1457.
In Aquatex v Techniche Solutions (CAFC 05-1088)
Prosecution history estoppel can prevent a patentee from relying on the doctrine of equivalents when the patentee relinquishes subject matter during the prosecution of the patent, either by amendment or argument. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 1999). “The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel limits the doctrine of equivalents when an applicant makes a narrowing amendment for purposes of patentability, or clearly and unmistakably surrenders subject matter by arguments made to an examiner.” Salazar, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13517, at *6; see Festo II, 535 U.S. at 736 (narrowing amendment for purposes of patentability); Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow Communication Labs., Inc., 305 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (argument-based estoppel).
曾經見過“argument-based estoppel”？我好像看過又好像沒有看過，就算是看過也不知道它是什麼意思，現在終於知道了。
不 僅 amendment 會適用禁反言，連 argument 也會而以 argument 適用禁反言的就叫做“argument-based estoppel”。但是要適用“argument-based estoppel”，檔案歷史就必須“ evince（顯示出） a clear and unmistakable surrender of subject matter.”，因此模擬兩可的話就不能適用。
To invoke argument-based estoppel, the prosecution history “must evince a clear and unmistakable surrender of subject matter.” Pharmacia, 170 F.3d at 1377 (internal quotation omitted). To determine if subject matter has been relinquished, an objective test is applied, inquiring “whether a competitor would reasonably believe that the applicant had surrendered the relevant subject matter.” Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1457.
9/09/2005
The construction of a claim's term
Network Commerce v. Microsoft (Fed. Cir. 2005).
來看看法官們在 claim construction 時是怎麼解譯一個 term ，也順便看看一個 term，它在訴訟中，會出現多少的解譯方式（參照上判決連結，僅貼出部分段落）：
The claims also assume that the “download component” is a component of a larger software system, that is, the download component does not alone direct the computer hardware to perform the designated tasks. The difficulty is that the claim language is not clear as to what other programs are to be used with the “download component.”
找出解譯 term 的困難處，預先為解譯找個方向。
We construe a claim term as having its “ordinary and customary meaning,” that is, “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. In some cases, it is possible to construe a claim term by applying “the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.” Id. at 1314. “Download component” is not a claim term amenable to construction in this manner because it has no commonly understood meaning reflected in general dictionaries or similar sources. We may also rely on a term’s “particular meaning in a field of art” when construing claims. Id. As the parties seem to agree, the term “download component” does not have a specialized meaning in the relevant art. Microsoft urges that “download component” does not have a particular meaning in the computer art; and that the term does not appear in computer dictionaries and treatises.
當沒有commonly understood meaning 時才用term’s “particular meaning in a field of art”。
Network Commerce also agrees that a definition of the term “download component” as a whole does not exist, but invites the court to combine individual dictionary definitions of “download” and “component.” Under that construction, any part of a system involved in the transfer of data from one computer to another would be a download component. This is not a tenable theory in light of the specification.
那用字典來組合這樣的解譯方式可以嗎？（也算是一個用來解譯 term 的方法。）不過最後還是得回到說明書中如何使用這個字，來進行解譯才是。
整 理這一篇是因為判例中解譯一個term的方式提出了好幾種，其中用combine individual dictionary definitions of “download” and “component”，是我潛意識下所使用的方式。就當作用來提醒自己隨時注意說明書對一個 term 的使用方式。
PS：
Coombs’ declaration provides scant support for Network Commerce’s position. As we recently reaffirmed in Phillips, “conclusory, unsupported assertions by experts as to the definition of a claim term are not useful to a court.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318. Here Coombs does not support his conclusion with any references to industry publications or other independent sources. Moreover, expert testimony at odds with the intrinsic evidence must be disregarded. Id. (“[A] court should discount any expert testimony that is clearly at odds with the claim construction mandated by . . . the written record of the patent.”). That is the case here.
at odds：不一致。
“conclusory, unsupported assertions by experts as to the definition of a claim term are not useful to a court.”
專家證詞如果沒有supported的話，不足為取。
來看看法官們在 claim construction 時是怎麼解譯一個 term ，也順便看看一個 term，它在訴訟中，會出現多少的解譯方式（參照上判決連結，僅貼出部分段落）：
The claims also assume that the “download component” is a component of a larger software system, that is, the download component does not alone direct the computer hardware to perform the designated tasks. The difficulty is that the claim language is not clear as to what other programs are to be used with the “download component.”
找出解譯 term 的困難處，預先為解譯找個方向。
We construe a claim term as having its “ordinary and customary meaning,” that is, “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. In some cases, it is possible to construe a claim term by applying “the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.” Id. at 1314. “Download component” is not a claim term amenable to construction in this manner because it has no commonly understood meaning reflected in general dictionaries or similar sources. We may also rely on a term’s “particular meaning in a field of art” when construing claims. Id. As the parties seem to agree, the term “download component” does not have a specialized meaning in the relevant art. Microsoft urges that “download component” does not have a particular meaning in the computer art; and that the term does not appear in computer dictionaries and treatises.
當沒有commonly understood meaning 時才用term’s “particular meaning in a field of art”。
Network Commerce also agrees that a definition of the term “download component” as a whole does not exist, but invites the court to combine individual dictionary definitions of “download” and “component.” Under that construction, any part of a system involved in the transfer of data from one computer to another would be a download component. This is not a tenable theory in light of the specification.
那用字典來組合這樣的解譯方式可以嗎？（也算是一個用來解譯 term 的方法。）不過最後還是得回到說明書中如何使用這個字，來進行解譯才是。
整 理這一篇是因為判例中解譯一個term的方式提出了好幾種，其中用combine individual dictionary definitions of “download” and “component”，是我潛意識下所使用的方式。就當作用來提醒自己隨時注意說明書對一個 term 的使用方式。
PS：
Coombs’ declaration provides scant support for Network Commerce’s position. As we recently reaffirmed in Phillips, “conclusory, unsupported assertions by experts as to the definition of a claim term are not useful to a court.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318. Here Coombs does not support his conclusion with any references to industry publications or other independent sources. Moreover, expert testimony at odds with the intrinsic evidence must be disregarded. Id. (“[A] court should discount any expert testimony that is clearly at odds with the claim construction mandated by . . . the written record of the patent.”). That is the case here.
at odds：不一致。
“conclusory, unsupported assertions by experts as to the definition of a claim term are not useful to a court.”
專家證詞如果沒有supported的話，不足為取。
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