【101】【112】關於enablement requirement和utility requirement
今天不小心看到一篇糾正我錯誤觀念的判例，關於enablement requirement和utility requirement。好久以前，曾看過一篇文章提到utility requirement不是很重要，但看來似乎不是喔！
試想“必要元件”，這個在臺灣使用的詞，表示claim必須限定到發明能夠“實施”的程度，那麼美國呢？相對於臺灣使用的“必要元件”，你覺得應該是屬於“enablement requirement”還是“utility requirement”？
PROCESS CONTROL CORPORATION, v. HYDRECLAIM CORPORATION
Lack of enablement and absence of utility are closely related grounds of unpatentability. See Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp. , 724 F.2d 951, 956, 220 USPQ 592, 596 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 requires that the specification adequately discloses to one skilled in the relevant art how to make, or in the case of a process, how to carry out, the claimed invention without undue experimentation. See Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S , 108 F.3d 1361, 1365, 42 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101 mandates that any patentable invention be useful and, accordingly, the subject matter of the claim must be operable. See Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. , 977 F.2d 1555, 1571, 24 USPQ2d 1401, 1412 (Fed. Cir. 1992). If a patent claim fails to meet the utility requirement because it is not useful or operative, then it also fails to meet the how-to-use aspect of the enablement requirement.
112的enablement requirement要求說明書適當的揭示，以在不需要undue experimentation的情況下，使one skilled in the relevant art能夠知道how to make, or in the case of a process, how to carry out, the claimed invention。相對於此，
101的utility requirement則是要求任何可專利的發明必須useful，因此其claim的主題必須是operable。當不符合utility requirement時，同時也不能滿足the how-to-use aspect of the enablement requirement。
In Raytheon , we held certain process claims invalid, stating
[b]ecause it is for the invention as claimed that enablement must clearly exist, and because the impossible cannot be enabled, a claim containing a limitation impossible to meet may be held invalid under § 112. Moreover, when a claim requires a means for accomplishing an unattainable result, the claimed invention must be considered inoperative as claimed and the claim must be held invalid under either § 101 or § 112 of 35 U.S.C.
上段模模糊糊的，這段更清楚了，包含一個limitation impossible to meet是不符合112，而缺少一個a means for accomplishing an unattainable result是不符合101。
PS：以前我從來沒有想過這會和101有關，算是糾正了我的觀念吧。
2/22/2006
【辭典】offering for sale 要約
【辭典】offering for sale 要約
來源：
「申出による販売」は、TRIPS第28条の基づき、定められた行為で、英語では「offering for sale」になり、商品のカタログや価格表などを送付し、それに係わる広告をし、又は競売広告をし、あるいは販売のために展示する場合です。
要約係為基於TRIPS第28條所規定的行為，係指為寄送商品的目錄、價格表等；進行販賣相關的廣告；進行販賣相關競標廣告；或為該販賣的展示等的情形。
來源：
「申出による販売」は、TRIPS第28条の基づき、定められた行為で、英語では「offering for sale」になり、商品のカタログや価格表などを送付し、それに係わる広告をし、又は競売広告をし、あるいは販売のために展示する場合です。
要約係為基於TRIPS第28條所規定的行為，係指為寄送商品的目錄、價格表等；進行販賣相關的廣告；進行販賣相關競標廣告；或為該販賣的展示等的情形。
2/21/2006
【112】【103】發明所達成的功效與112
【112】【103】發明所達成的功效與112
Case AQUATEX INDUSTRIES, INC., v. TECHNICHE SOLUTIONS
The district court based its nonenablement judgment on two grounds: (1) lack of utility or inoperability and (2) undue experimentation needed to carry out the invention.
【112】
The district court considered that "the first wafers processed with the Full Flow system appeared clean to the naked eye" but looked "filthy" viewed using laser scanning.
At the outset, the district court erred in requiring that the patent disclosures enable a single embodiment, the Full Flow system, to meet TI’s commercial standards. In essence, the district court set the enablement bar too high. Enablement does not require an inventor to meet lofty standards for success in the commercial marketplace. Title 35 does not require that a patent disclosure enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use a perfected, commercially viable embodiment absent a claim limitation to that effect.
Title 35 requires only that the inventor enable one of skill in the art to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention. Thus, when an invention claims a general system to improve the cleaning process for semiconductor wafers, the disclosure enables that invention by showing improvements in the overall system. See, e.g., Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The enablement requirement is met if the description enables any mode of making and using the claimed invention.”). Of course, if a patent claimed a system that achieved cleanliness up to a specified numerical particle-free range, then enablement would require disclosure of a method that enables one of ordinary skill to achieve that range without undue experimentation. Thus, the level of disclosure necessary to satisfy section 112 of title 35 varies according to the scope of the claimed invention. Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvania Inc., 256 F.3d 1298, 1306-07 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
專利法112要求 “enablement”，但是應“enablement”到什麼樣的程度？這就要視說明書中所聲稱之發明所達成的功效而定。因此，如果「if a patent claimed a system that achieved cleanliness up to a specified numerical particle-free range, then enablement would require disclosure of a method that enables one of ordinary skill to achieve that range without undue experimentation」。故在寫發明所達成的功效時，最好僅是一般的描述，不要寫的太明確，不然所要求的“enablement”程度也會變的很高。
你能分清什麼是inoperative？什麼是enablement嗎？
The district court essentially concluded that the invention claimed in the patents at issue simply did not work, that is, could not clean wafers, and therefore it would require undue experimentation to carry out the invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). This court has recognized the relationship between the enablement requirement of § 112 and the utility requirement of § 101. See, e.g., In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("[I]f the claims in an application fail to meet the utility requirement because the invention is inoperative, they also fail to meet the enablement requirement because a person skilled in the art cannot practice the invention"); EMI Group N. Am., Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 268 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In this case, however, the district court similarly set the standard for utility too high for this invention. While the district court's major premise is correct that an inoperable invention is not enabled, the district court erred in its minor premise that the claimed invention is inoperable and lacks utility.
The inoperability standard for utility applies primarily to claims with impossible limitations. See, e.g., Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (claims found inoperable because they require violating the principle of conservation of mass); Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (claims to a perpetual motion machine ruled inoperable). Moreover, where a patent discloses several alternative combinations of methods (as most systems claims will), the party asserting inoperability must show that all disclosed alternatives are inoperative or not enabled. EMI Group, 268 F.3d at 1349. The '532 and '123 patents do not claim an impossible result or an inoperative invention.
Even if the single Full Flow embodiment does not achieve complete cleaning, that alone would not render the invention inoperative.
簡單地說成不符合utility requirement【101】就是不inoperative；而不符合enablement requirement【112】 就是不enablement，這樣解釋對嗎？
【103】
(obviousness requires a suggestion of all limitations in a claim). Therefore the examiner did not appear to resort to consideration of secondary considerations, such as the unexpected results and advantages in the quoted statements, to surmount the obviousness objection. In sum, the advantages advocacy was not as highly material as the district court seemed to think.
An applicant cannot prove unexpected results with attorney argument and bare statements without objective evidentiary support. See In re Lindner, 457 F.2d 506, 508 (CCPA 1972); In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("attorney argument [is] not the kind of factual evidence that is required to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness"); In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 750 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("It is well settled that unexpected results must be established by factual evidence. Mere argument or conclusory statements . . . [do] not suffice."
顯而易知性需要Claim所有的限制條件都被暗示，另外光是用說的，還是無法克服prima facie case of obviousness，需要有objective evidentiary support。這讓我想到了有一次為客戶寫答辯搞，客戶聲稱他的發明的一個優點，可以卻又不提出實驗證據，不知該那件案子的審查委員會怎麼樣審那案子？事實上，用說的比較快，要做實驗的話真的很麻煩的，我很懷疑在現實的實務上，會僅為中間程序的處理而做實驗取數據，進行答辯。
Case AQUATEX INDUSTRIES, INC., v. TECHNICHE SOLUTIONS
The district court based its nonenablement judgment on two grounds: (1) lack of utility or inoperability and (2) undue experimentation needed to carry out the invention.
【112】
The district court considered that "the first wafers processed with the Full Flow system appeared clean to the naked eye" but looked "filthy" viewed using laser scanning.
At the outset, the district court erred in requiring that the patent disclosures enable a single embodiment, the Full Flow system, to meet TI’s commercial standards. In essence, the district court set the enablement bar too high. Enablement does not require an inventor to meet lofty standards for success in the commercial marketplace. Title 35 does not require that a patent disclosure enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use a perfected, commercially viable embodiment absent a claim limitation to that effect.
Title 35 requires only that the inventor enable one of skill in the art to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention. Thus, when an invention claims a general system to improve the cleaning process for semiconductor wafers, the disclosure enables that invention by showing improvements in the overall system. See, e.g., Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The enablement requirement is met if the description enables any mode of making and using the claimed invention.”). Of course, if a patent claimed a system that achieved cleanliness up to a specified numerical particle-free range, then enablement would require disclosure of a method that enables one of ordinary skill to achieve that range without undue experimentation. Thus, the level of disclosure necessary to satisfy section 112 of title 35 varies according to the scope of the claimed invention. Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvania Inc., 256 F.3d 1298, 1306-07 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
專利法112要求 “enablement”，但是應“enablement”到什麼樣的程度？這就要視說明書中所聲稱之發明所達成的功效而定。因此，如果「if a patent claimed a system that achieved cleanliness up to a specified numerical particle-free range, then enablement would require disclosure of a method that enables one of ordinary skill to achieve that range without undue experimentation」。故在寫發明所達成的功效時，最好僅是一般的描述，不要寫的太明確，不然所要求的“enablement”程度也會變的很高。
你能分清什麼是inoperative？什麼是enablement嗎？
The district court essentially concluded that the invention claimed in the patents at issue simply did not work, that is, could not clean wafers, and therefore it would require undue experimentation to carry out the invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). This court has recognized the relationship between the enablement requirement of § 112 and the utility requirement of § 101. See, e.g., In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("[I]f the claims in an application fail to meet the utility requirement because the invention is inoperative, they also fail to meet the enablement requirement because a person skilled in the art cannot practice the invention"); EMI Group N. Am., Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 268 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In this case, however, the district court similarly set the standard for utility too high for this invention. While the district court's major premise is correct that an inoperable invention is not enabled, the district court erred in its minor premise that the claimed invention is inoperable and lacks utility.
The inoperability standard for utility applies primarily to claims with impossible limitations. See, e.g., Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (claims found inoperable because they require violating the principle of conservation of mass); Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (claims to a perpetual motion machine ruled inoperable). Moreover, where a patent discloses several alternative combinations of methods (as most systems claims will), the party asserting inoperability must show that all disclosed alternatives are inoperative or not enabled. EMI Group, 268 F.3d at 1349. The '532 and '123 patents do not claim an impossible result or an inoperative invention.
Even if the single Full Flow embodiment does not achieve complete cleaning, that alone would not render the invention inoperative.
簡單地說成不符合utility requirement【101】就是不inoperative；而不符合enablement requirement【112】 就是不enablement，這樣解釋對嗎？
【103】
(obviousness requires a suggestion of all limitations in a claim). Therefore the examiner did not appear to resort to consideration of secondary considerations, such as the unexpected results and advantages in the quoted statements, to surmount the obviousness objection. In sum, the advantages advocacy was not as highly material as the district court seemed to think.
An applicant cannot prove unexpected results with attorney argument and bare statements without objective evidentiary support. See In re Lindner, 457 F.2d 506, 508 (CCPA 1972); In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("attorney argument [is] not the kind of factual evidence that is required to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness"); In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 750 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("It is well settled that unexpected results must be established by factual evidence. Mere argument or conclusory statements . . . [do] not suffice."
顯而易知性需要Claim所有的限制條件都被暗示，另外光是用說的，還是無法克服prima facie case of obviousness，需要有objective evidentiary support。這讓我想到了有一次為客戶寫答辯搞，客戶聲稱他的發明的一個優點，可以卻又不提出實驗證據，不知該那件案子的審查委員會怎麼樣審那案子？事實上，用說的比較快，要做實驗的話真的很麻煩的，我很懷疑在現實的實務上，會僅為中間程序的處理而做實驗取數據，進行答辯。
2/17/2006
【Claim】用語限定為習知技術時就不包含未來的技術
【Claim】用語限定為習知技術時就不包含未來的技術
KOPYKAKE ENTERPRISES v. The Lucks Company
於此案中，Kopykake將“screen printing”限定為習知技術：
[T]he pictorial images will be referred to as being applied to the base shapes by “screen printing”, it being understood that the term screen printing as used herein encompasses not only conventional screen printing, but also includes any other conventional printing process and any other conventional means and methods of applying the pictorial images to the base shapes, unless the context should indicate otherwise.
SUPERGUIDE CORPORATION, V. DIRECTV ENTERPRISES, INC., DIRECTV, INC.,
The limitation at issue in Kopykake required "screen printing" of images on foodstuffs and the accused product used "ink jet printing." Id. at 1380. Thus, the issue was whether the claim language "screen printing" literally covered ink jet printing. Id. The specification explicitly defined the term "screen printing" as limited to "'conventional'" or then-existing technologies. Id. Specifically, the specification stated that "'the term screen printing as used herein encompasses not only conventional screen printing, but also includes any other conventional printing process and any other conventional means.'" Id. (citation omitted). Although ink jet systems were well known in the field of paper printing, it was not a conventional printing process for applying images to foodstuffs. Id. at 1383-84. We therefore held that ink jet printing was not covered by the claim term at issue. Id. at 1384. That holding, however, does not have relevance here because the patentees in Kopykake explicitly limited the claim term to technologies that were "conventional" at the time of the invention. In contrast, the '578 patentees did not explicitly limit the disputed claim language to technologies that were "conventional" at the time of the invention.
之後的技術“ink jet printing”，雖然在發明當時已廣泛使用於“paper printing”但是因為不同領域的關係，因此“screen printing”被解譯成不包含“ink jet printing”。
下面也有一個類似的案例，
PC Connector Solutions sued SmartDisk and Fuji Photo Film U.S.A. for patent infringement of 5,224,216.
As a consequence, the terms “normally,” “conventional,” “traditionally,” and “standard” are governed by their ordinary and customary meanings, and that, in view of their implicit time-dependence, …….
有趣的Tip一定要看一下：
Tip to patent prosecutors: leave convention, tradition, and normality to psychologists and sociologists. Claim just the facts, as if they were timeless.
PS：寫說明書時，請小心使用“習知”等字眼，尤其是Kopykake案例中的情形，感覺很容易犯錯，雖然在claim中無“習知”的限定，但在說明書中定義時加入這樣的字眼，在解釋申請專利範圍時還是有可能產生限制的，讓我覺得奇怪的是，文義解譯雖然不能包含未來技術，但均等論應該可以包含未來的技術才是啊？此案中為什麼都沒有討論要不要適用均等論的問題？
KOPYKAKE ENTERPRISES v. The Lucks Company
於此案中，Kopykake將“screen printing”限定為習知技術：
[T]he pictorial images will be referred to as being applied to the base shapes by “screen printing”, it being understood that the term screen printing as used herein encompasses not only conventional screen printing, but also includes any other conventional printing process and any other conventional means and methods of applying the pictorial images to the base shapes, unless the context should indicate otherwise.
SUPERGUIDE CORPORATION, V. DIRECTV ENTERPRISES, INC., DIRECTV, INC.,
The limitation at issue in Kopykake required "screen printing" of images on foodstuffs and the accused product used "ink jet printing." Id. at 1380. Thus, the issue was whether the claim language "screen printing" literally covered ink jet printing. Id. The specification explicitly defined the term "screen printing" as limited to "'conventional'" or then-existing technologies. Id. Specifically, the specification stated that "'the term screen printing as used herein encompasses not only conventional screen printing, but also includes any other conventional printing process and any other conventional means.'" Id. (citation omitted). Although ink jet systems were well known in the field of paper printing, it was not a conventional printing process for applying images to foodstuffs. Id. at 1383-84. We therefore held that ink jet printing was not covered by the claim term at issue. Id. at 1384. That holding, however, does not have relevance here because the patentees in Kopykake explicitly limited the claim term to technologies that were "conventional" at the time of the invention. In contrast, the '578 patentees did not explicitly limit the disputed claim language to technologies that were "conventional" at the time of the invention.
之後的技術“ink jet printing”，雖然在發明當時已廣泛使用於“paper printing”但是因為不同領域的關係，因此“screen printing”被解譯成不包含“ink jet printing”。
下面也有一個類似的案例，
PC Connector Solutions sued SmartDisk and Fuji Photo Film U.S.A. for patent infringement of 5,224,216.
As a consequence, the terms “normally,” “conventional,” “traditionally,” and “standard” are governed by their ordinary and customary meanings, and that, in view of their implicit time-dependence, …….
有趣的Tip一定要看一下：
Tip to patent prosecutors: leave convention, tradition, and normality to psychologists and sociologists. Claim just the facts, as if they were timeless.
PS：寫說明書時，請小心使用“習知”等字眼，尤其是Kopykake案例中的情形，感覺很容易犯錯，雖然在claim中無“習知”的限定，但在說明書中定義時加入這樣的字眼，在解釋申請專利範圍時還是有可能產生限制的，讓我覺得奇怪的是，文義解譯雖然不能包含未來技術，但均等論應該可以包含未來的技術才是啊？此案中為什麼都沒有討論要不要適用均等論的問題？
2/15/2006
【Claim】公示放棄原則與112
【Claim】公示放棄原則與112
The Toro Company v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc., et al.
In Johnson & Johnston, this court held that
when a patent drafter discloses but declines to claim subject matter . . . this action dedicates that unclaimed subject matter to the public. Application of the doctrine of equivalents to recapture subject matter deliberately left unclaimed would “conflict with the primacy of the claims in defining the scope of the patentee’s exclusive right.”
the disclosure-dedication rule 公示放棄原則：
有揭示但卻沒有claim的範圍，視為貢獻於公眾，不論是文意範圍或是均等範圍。
於此案中，原告Toro提出因所揭示的內容揭露不足，故不能適用the disclosure-dedication rule。CAFC法官則認為，即使揭露不足一樣會適用公示放棄原則：
As noted above, the written description necessary to support a claim construction is not necessarily the same as the disclosure of subject matter needed to invoke the disclosure-dedication rule. Material that is explicitly disclaimed in the specification—like the disclaimer of a removable ring in this case—is disclosed for purposes of the disclosure-dedication rule, but it cannot be encompassed within the scope of the claims.
此判例中CAFC法官還對Law of the Case做了些解譯。
【摘譯】
this claim construction “did not and could not import into the claim a function from the specification, particularly when the claim recites only purely structural limitations.” Id. (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
解譯申請專利範圍，不會也不能從說明書中將功能引進申請專利範圍內，尤其是當申請專利範圍僅純粹敘述結構上的限制條件。
The Toro Company v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc., et al.
In Johnson & Johnston, this court held that
when a patent drafter discloses but declines to claim subject matter . . . this action dedicates that unclaimed subject matter to the public. Application of the doctrine of equivalents to recapture subject matter deliberately left unclaimed would “conflict with the primacy of the claims in defining the scope of the patentee’s exclusive right.”
the disclosure-dedication rule 公示放棄原則：
有揭示但卻沒有claim的範圍，視為貢獻於公眾，不論是文意範圍或是均等範圍。
於此案中，原告Toro提出因所揭示的內容揭露不足，故不能適用the disclosure-dedication rule。CAFC法官則認為，即使揭露不足一樣會適用公示放棄原則：
As noted above, the written description necessary to support a claim construction is not necessarily the same as the disclosure of subject matter needed to invoke the disclosure-dedication rule. Material that is explicitly disclaimed in the specification—like the disclaimer of a removable ring in this case—is disclosed for purposes of the disclosure-dedication rule, but it cannot be encompassed within the scope of the claims.
此判例中CAFC法官還對Law of the Case做了些解譯。
【摘譯】
this claim construction “did not and could not import into the claim a function from the specification, particularly when the claim recites only purely structural limitations.” Id. (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
解譯申請專利範圍，不會也不能從說明書中將功能引進申請專利範圍內，尤其是當申請專利範圍僅純粹敘述結構上的限制條件。
2/14/2006
【摘譯】【Claim】CAFC判例中適用逆均等論次數
【摘譯】【Claim】CAFC判例中適用逆均等論次數
TATE ACCESS FLOORS, INC v. INTERFACE ARCHITECTURAL RESOURCES
Not once has this court affirmed a decision finding noninfringement based on the reverse doctrine of equivalents. And with good reason: when Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 112, after the decision in Graver Tank, it imposed requirements for the written description, enablement, definiteness, and means-plus-function claims that are co-extensive with the broadest possible reach of the reverse doctrine of equivalents. See In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1194 & n.5, 29 USPQ2d 1845, 1849-50 & n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (rejecting Commissioner's argument that by enacting § 112 Congress intended only to codify the reverse doctrine of equivalents and thereby to render the requirements applicable only in the litigation context, and therefore holding that the requirements of § 112, ¶ 6 apply to all interpretations of means-plus-function claim language, but noting that one result of enacting § 112 may have been to codify the reverse doctrine of equivalents); cf. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1569, 35 USPQ2d 1641, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Nies, J., dissenting) (noting that the reverse doctrine of equivalents was originally used by the courts to reduce the scope of broad "means" claims to "cover only what the inventor discloses and equivalents thereof"), rev'd and remanded, 520 U.S. 17, 41 USPQ2d 1865 (1997).
本庭未曾確定基於逆均等論之非侵害的判決。
PS：逆均等論原是過去用於限縮功能手段用語之請求項的權利範圍，現在僅是法理上存在的一個理論，實際運用上是很少的，通常它的部分，都會被正確的「申請專利範圍解譯（Claim construction）」給取代。
今在一本書看到CAFC的一個判例“SRI international v. Matsushita Electric”，此判例認為，沒有足夠的差異，主張依逆均等論確定非侵害，此判例中亦有反對立場的少數意見，可以參考。
TATE ACCESS FLOORS, INC v. INTERFACE ARCHITECTURAL RESOURCES
Not once has this court affirmed a decision finding noninfringement based on the reverse doctrine of equivalents. And with good reason: when Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 112, after the decision in Graver Tank, it imposed requirements for the written description, enablement, definiteness, and means-plus-function claims that are co-extensive with the broadest possible reach of the reverse doctrine of equivalents. See In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1194 & n.5, 29 USPQ2d 1845, 1849-50 & n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (rejecting Commissioner's argument that by enacting § 112 Congress intended only to codify the reverse doctrine of equivalents and thereby to render the requirements applicable only in the litigation context, and therefore holding that the requirements of § 112, ¶ 6 apply to all interpretations of means-plus-function claim language, but noting that one result of enacting § 112 may have been to codify the reverse doctrine of equivalents); cf. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1569, 35 USPQ2d 1641, 1688-89 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Nies, J., dissenting) (noting that the reverse doctrine of equivalents was originally used by the courts to reduce the scope of broad "means" claims to "cover only what the inventor discloses and equivalents thereof"), rev'd and remanded, 520 U.S. 17, 41 USPQ2d 1865 (1997).
本庭未曾確定基於逆均等論之非侵害的判決。
PS：逆均等論原是過去用於限縮功能手段用語之請求項的權利範圍，現在僅是法理上存在的一個理論，實際運用上是很少的，通常它的部分，都會被正確的「申請專利範圍解譯（Claim construction）」給取代。
今在一本書看到CAFC的一個判例“SRI international v. Matsushita Electric”，此判例認為，沒有足夠的差異，主張依逆均等論確定非侵害，此判例中亦有反對立場的少數意見，可以參考。
2/10/2006
【Link】一些值得讀的文章及電子書
【Link】一些值得讀的文章及電子書
好久以前整理的，不過也好久沒有更新了，書，要是真的能讓人給讀完就好了。
１０１大道：
USPTO上的101訓練教材●35 U.S.C. 101 Training Materials ●Bioinformatics & §101
●Software Protection: Patents：在網路上看到的文章
(image placeholder)
(image placeholder)
１０3大道： 美國歐洲日本進步性之比較
(image placeholder)
美專112：（整準備開始研究，列一下在google找到的資料）
●美國專利商標局提出「書面揭示要件」審查基準 「書面揭示要件 ...
●生物技術審查基準之國際趨勢
●{DOC}美國聯邦巡迴上訴法院Honeywell Int'lv
●Patent Validity and Scope
●SYNOPSIS OF APPLICATION OF WRITTEN DESCRIPTION GUIDELINES：uspto上的資料，介紹written description的審查基準。
●the evolving application of the written description requirement to biotechnological inventions：此篇介紹了written description requirement的歷史，一定要看，推薦！
●The Postmodern Written Description Requirement: An Analysis of the ...： 大部分都是在講有關生技專利中，將依據“written description”的rejection，應用到一開始所提出專利說明書之原請求項的問題，因為這個要件在以前不會被認為會限制原請求項，必竟原請 求項也是說明書的一部分，可惜我對written description 的觀念似懂非懂的，所以沒辦法完全看懂，建議先讀完上一篇再讀這篇，我是倒著讀的，因為網路的資料如海賊王中偉大的航道一樣，沒有地圖只好靠著羅盤自己到 處逛，小弟的願望與娜米相同，做個“自學專利地圖”，提供小弟一路學專利的路徑。●其他按一下： 用google搜尋還真的可以找到一堆關於112的許多文章，關鍵字是用「the evolving application of the written description requirement to biotechnological inventions」。
(image placeholder)
解譯申請專利範圍
均等論●Johnson & Johnston Washes Away the Doctrine of Equivalents：有關說明書有揭露，而claims沒有請求，則此部分認定為貢獻給大眾的論文，介紹了三個重要的case，其中先前兩個是互相相反的案例。●Doctrine of Equivalents – It’s not all about Festo●貳、案情背景：專利老前輩羅先生的文章。●An Analysis of Trends in the Construction of US Patent Claims : 1997-2002...：解譯申請專利範圍的論文，介紹了很多的原則，推薦！
(image placeholder)
其他專利相關及未找到適當分類的
●美國專利標示：美國專利標示(Patent Marking)
●美國專利法中文版：美國專利法中文版
●AMENDMENT AND RESPONSE IN THE MECHANICAL ARTS：教你如何進行答辯，英文也不是很難，至少比mpep簡單許多，推薦！
●1999 專利侵權個案分析案例資料庫：一些美國案例中文摘要的連結。
(image placeholder)
羅炳榮先生的文章收集抱殘守缺 http://www.ipnavigator.com.tw/news/news_view.asp?NewsID=20050504111956
(image placeholder)
竟然讓我不小心找到一整本有關專利法的書，它是Polk Wagner教授的上課課本，可以參觀一下Polk Wagner教授為他專利法的學生所做的網頁，還有Polk Wagner教授的blog站，下載電子書的連結如下，最好的下載下式是使用firefox和scrapbook，而且完全免費，推薦！
(image placeholder)
(image placeholder)
●Reexamination
http://www.taie.com.tw/1392.htm
台一專利商標事務所撰寫之「 美國專利復審制度(Reexamination) 」
●RCE與CPA之比較
http://www.hitek.com.tw/news-9.htm
海天國際專利商標事務所撰寫之「續案申請Request for Continued Examination(RCE)及Continued Prosecution Application(CPA)之比較 」
●http://www.hitek.com.tw/news-1.htm
海天國際專利商標事務所撰寫之「 美國專利審查手冊(MPEP)中第 2000章關於揭露之義務(Duty of Disclosure) 」
小個體身份變動與專利有效性關係
●http://www.taie.com.tw/1354.htm
由台一專利商標事務所撰寫之「未及時陳報小個體身份變動與專利有效性關係 」
好久以前整理的，不過也好久沒有更新了，書，要是真的能讓人給讀完就好了。
１０１大道：
USPTO上的101訓練教材●35 U.S.C. 101 Training Materials ●Bioinformatics & §101
●Software Protection: Patents：在網路上看到的文章
(image placeholder)
(image placeholder)
１０3大道： 美國歐洲日本進步性之比較
(image placeholder)
美專112：（整準備開始研究，列一下在google找到的資料）
●美國專利商標局提出「書面揭示要件」審查基準 「書面揭示要件 ...
●生物技術審查基準之國際趨勢
●{DOC}美國聯邦巡迴上訴法院Honeywell Int'lv
●Patent Validity and Scope
●SYNOPSIS OF APPLICATION OF WRITTEN DESCRIPTION GUIDELINES：uspto上的資料，介紹written description的審查基準。
●the evolving application of the written description requirement to biotechnological inventions：此篇介紹了written description requirement的歷史，一定要看，推薦！
●The Postmodern Written Description Requirement: An Analysis of the ...： 大部分都是在講有關生技專利中，將依據“written description”的rejection，應用到一開始所提出專利說明書之原請求項的問題，因為這個要件在以前不會被認為會限制原請求項，必竟原請 求項也是說明書的一部分，可惜我對written description 的觀念似懂非懂的，所以沒辦法完全看懂，建議先讀完上一篇再讀這篇，我是倒著讀的，因為網路的資料如海賊王中偉大的航道一樣，沒有地圖只好靠著羅盤自己到 處逛，小弟的願望與娜米相同，做個“自學專利地圖”，提供小弟一路學專利的路徑。●其他按一下： 用google搜尋還真的可以找到一堆關於112的許多文章，關鍵字是用「the evolving application of the written description requirement to biotechnological inventions」。
(image placeholder)
解譯申請專利範圍
均等論●Johnson & Johnston Washes Away the Doctrine of Equivalents：有關說明書有揭露，而claims沒有請求，則此部分認定為貢獻給大眾的論文，介紹了三個重要的case，其中先前兩個是互相相反的案例。●Doctrine of Equivalents – It’s not all about Festo●貳、案情背景：專利老前輩羅先生的文章。●An Analysis of Trends in the Construction of US Patent Claims : 1997-2002...：解譯申請專利範圍的論文，介紹了很多的原則，推薦！
(image placeholder)
其他專利相關及未找到適當分類的
●美國專利標示：美國專利標示(Patent Marking)
●美國專利法中文版：美國專利法中文版
●AMENDMENT AND RESPONSE IN THE MECHANICAL ARTS：教你如何進行答辯，英文也不是很難，至少比mpep簡單許多，推薦！
●1999 專利侵權個案分析案例資料庫：一些美國案例中文摘要的連結。
(image placeholder)
羅炳榮先生的文章收集抱殘守缺 http://www.ipnavigator.com.tw/news/news_view.asp?NewsID=20050504111956
(image placeholder)
竟然讓我不小心找到一整本有關專利法的書，它是Polk Wagner教授的上課課本，可以參觀一下Polk Wagner教授為他專利法的學生所做的網頁，還有Polk Wagner教授的blog站，下載電子書的連結如下，最好的下載下式是使用firefox和scrapbook，而且完全免費，推薦！
(image placeholder)
(image placeholder)
●Reexamination
http://www.taie.com.tw/1392.htm
台一專利商標事務所撰寫之「 美國專利復審制度(Reexamination) 」
●RCE與CPA之比較
http://www.hitek.com.tw/news-9.htm
海天國際專利商標事務所撰寫之「續案申請Request for Continued Examination(RCE)及Continued Prosecution Application(CPA)之比較 」
●http://www.hitek.com.tw/news-1.htm
海天國際專利商標事務所撰寫之「 美國專利審查手冊(MPEP)中第 2000章關於揭露之義務(Duty of Disclosure) 」
小個體身份變動與專利有效性關係
●http://www.taie.com.tw/1354.htm
由台一專利商標事務所撰寫之「未及時陳報小個體身份變動與專利有效性關係 」
【排程】數值限定發明
【103】非顯而易知性
2/09/2006
【Claim】【摘譯】文字的本質、及辭書編纂者的法理
【Claim】【摘譯】文字的本質、及辭書編纂者的法理
為什麼專利法允許發明人自己當作辭書編纂者？若有興趣可以參考Autogiro Co. of America v. United States, 181 Ct. Cl. 55, 384 F.2d 391, 155 U.S.P.Q. 697 (Ct. Cl. 1967)中，Justice Frankfurther 的comment。
The very nature of words would make a clear and unambiguous claim rare.
文字的性質本身，讓作成一明確及豪無疑義的請求項，非常罕見。
An invention exists most importantly as a tangible structure or a series of drawings. A verbal portrayal is usually an afterthought written to satisfy the requirements of patent law. This conversion of machine to words allows for unintended idea gaps, which cannot be satisfactorily filled. Often the invention is novel and words do not exist to describe it. The dictionary does not always keep abreast of the inventor. It cannot. Things are not made for the sake of words, but words for things. To overcome this lag, patent law allows the inventor to be his own lexicographer.
最重要的是，發明係以物理的結構或一系列圖的方式產生，語言的描寫通常是為滿足專利法的要件，而於事後將想法寫下，將機構轉換成文字可能會產生非意圖的思想間隙，而這思想間隙又無法令人滿意地被填滿。發明常常是新穎的，描述它的文字不存在，字典經常無法與發明人保持同步，也不可能，事物並非為文字產生，但文字為事物產生。為克服此落後差距，專利法允許發明人當作自己的辭書編纂者。
PS：很多規則都有它的法理，只是規則看久了就會讓人忘記去了解它的法理，一切把它當做理所當然，我常常這樣，看到一個規則就直接吸收卻很少去想“為什麼”，以Justice Frankfurther這段深具法理的文字，期許自己克服思考的慣性，大家加油。只是！了解這又能做什麼用？實務上用得到嗎？
為什麼專利法允許發明人自己當作辭書編纂者？若有興趣可以參考Autogiro Co. of America v. United States, 181 Ct. Cl. 55, 384 F.2d 391, 155 U.S.P.Q. 697 (Ct. Cl. 1967)中，Justice Frankfurther 的comment。
The very nature of words would make a clear and unambiguous claim rare.
文字的性質本身，讓作成一明確及豪無疑義的請求項，非常罕見。
An invention exists most importantly as a tangible structure or a series of drawings. A verbal portrayal is usually an afterthought written to satisfy the requirements of patent law. This conversion of machine to words allows for unintended idea gaps, which cannot be satisfactorily filled. Often the invention is novel and words do not exist to describe it. The dictionary does not always keep abreast of the inventor. It cannot. Things are not made for the sake of words, but words for things. To overcome this lag, patent law allows the inventor to be his own lexicographer.
最重要的是，發明係以物理的結構或一系列圖的方式產生，語言的描寫通常是為滿足專利法的要件，而於事後將想法寫下，將機構轉換成文字可能會產生非意圖的思想間隙，而這思想間隙又無法令人滿意地被填滿。發明常常是新穎的，描述它的文字不存在，字典經常無法與發明人保持同步，也不可能，事物並非為文字產生，但文字為事物產生。為克服此落後差距，專利法允許發明人當作自己的辭書編纂者。
PS：很多規則都有它的法理，只是規則看久了就會讓人忘記去了解它的法理，一切把它當做理所當然，我常常這樣，看到一個規則就直接吸收卻很少去想“為什麼”，以Justice Frankfurther這段深具法理的文字，期許自己克服思考的慣性，大家加油。只是！了解這又能做什麼用？實務上用得到嗎？
2/08/2006
【Claim】說明書中的限制條件是否應讀進申請專利範圍
【Claim】說明書中的限制條件是否應讀進申請專利範圍
RENISHAW PLC v MARPOSS SOCIETA' PER AZIONI, ET AL.
要了解申請專利範圍的解譯這是一個很重要的判例，我覺得，它主要是探討是不是應將說明書中的限制條件，讀進申請專利範圍來限制權利範圍的情形。
Renishaw, of course, alludes to a familiar pair of claim construction canons: (a) one may not read a limitation into a claim from the written description, but (b) one may look to the written description to define a term already in a claim limitation, for a claim must be read in view of the specification of which it is a part. These two rules lay out the general relationship between the claims and the written description. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc. , 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 USPQ2d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. , 52 F.3d 967, 979-80, 34 USPQ2d 1321, 1329-30 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), aff'd , 517 U.S. 370, 38 USPQ2d 1461 (1996). As rules at the core of claim construction methodology, they provide guideposts for a spectrum of claim construction problems.
Although no canon of construction is absolute in its application, these two rules share two underlying propositions. First, it is manifest that a claim must explicitly recite a term in need of definition before a definition may enter the claim from the written description. This is so because the claims define the scope of the right to exclude; the claim construction inquiry, therefore, begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of the claim, see AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp. , 122 F.3d 1019, 1023, 43 USPQ2d 1545, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[T]he language of the claim frames and ultimately resolves all issues of claim interpretation."); Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp. , 55 F.3d 615, 619-20, 34 USPQ2d 1816, 1819 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The intrinsic evidence, and, in some cases, the extrinsic evidence, can shed light on the meaning of the terms recited in a claim, either by confirming the ordinary meaning of the claim terms or by providing special meaning for claim terms. See Vitronics , 90 F.3d at 1583, 39 USPQ2d at 1577. However, the resulting claim interpretation must, in the end, accord with the words chosen by the patentee to stake out the boundary of the claimed property. See Thermalloy, Inc. v. Aavid Eng'g, Inc. , 121 F.3d 691, 693, 43 USPQ2d 1846, 1848 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[T]hroughout the interpretation process, the focus remains on the meaning of claim language.").
Thus, a party wishing to use statements in the written description to confine or otherwise affect a patent's scope must, at the very least, point to a term or terms in the claim with which to draw in those statements. Without any claim term that is susceptible of clarification by the written description, there is no legitimate way to narrow the property right. The Supreme Court has clearly stated the rationale for this requirement:
[W]e know of no principle of law which would authorize us to read into a claim an element which is not present, for the purpose of making out a case of novelty or infringement. The difficulty is that if we once begin to include elements not mentioned in the claim in order to limit such claim . . ., we should never know where to stop.
McCarty v. Lehigh Valley R.R. , 160 U.S. 110, 116 (1895). If we need not rely on a limitation to interpret what the patentee meant by a particular term or phrase in a claim, that limitation is "extraneous" and cannot constrain the claim. See Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc. , 9 F.3d 948, 950, 28 USPQ2d 1936, 1938 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("It is improper for a court to add 'extraneous' limitations to a claim, that is, limitations added wholly apart from any need to interpret what the patentee meant by particular words or phrases in the claim." (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. , 849 F.2d 1430, 1433, 7 USPQ2d 1129, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp. , 845 F.2d 981, 987, 6 USPQ2d 1601, 1605 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Where a specification does not require a limitation, that limitation should not be read from the specification into the claims." (citing Lemelson v. United States , 752 F.2d 1538, 1551- 52, 224 USPQ 526, 534 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); cf. Constant v. Advanced Micro- Devices, Inc. , 848 F.2d 1560, 1571, 7 USPQ2d 1057, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that the written description provided "no evidence to indicate that [] limitations must be imported into the claims to give meaning to disputed terms").
The other clear point provided by these two canons covers the situation in which a patent applicant has elected to be a lexicographer by providing an explicit definition in the specification for a claim term. In such a case, the definition selected by the patent applicant controls. The patentee's lexicography must, of course, appear "with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision" before it can affect the claim. In re Paulsen , 30 F.3d 1475, 1480, 31 USPQ2d 1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc. , 952 F.2d 1384, 1388, 21 USPQ2d 1383, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1992). If the patentee provides such a clear definition, the two canons require reference to the written description, because only there is the claim term defined as it is used by the patentee. The law provides a patentee with this opportunity because the public may not be schooled in the terminology of the technical art or there may not be an extant term of singular meaning for the structure or concept that is being claimed. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp. , 733 F.2d 881, 889, 221 USPQ 1025, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Absent a special and particular definition created by the patent applicant, terms in a claim are to be given their ordinary and accustomed meaning. See York Prods., Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Ctr. , 99 F.3d 1568, 1572, 40 USPQ2d 1619, 1622 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Without an express intent to impart a novel meaning to claim terms, an inventor's claim terms take on their ordinary meaning."); Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., Inc. , 15 F.3d 1573, 1577, 27 USPQ2d 1836, 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Thus, when a claim term is expressed in general descriptive words, we will not ordinarily limit the term to a numerical range that may appear in the written description or in other claims. See Modine Mfg. , 75 F.3d at 1551, 37 USPQ2d at 1612. Nor may we, in the broader situation, add a narrowing modifier before an otherwise general term that stands unmodified in a claim. See, e.g. , Bell Communications , 55 F.3d at 621-22, 34 USPQ2d at 1821 (faulting the district court for interpreting claim term "associating" to cover only explicit, and not implicit, association); Specialty Composites , 845 F.2d at 986-87, 6 USPQ2d at 1604 (refusing to limit the recited claim term "plasticizer" to external plasticizers where skilled artisans used the term broadly). For example, if an apparatus claim recites a general structure ( e.g. , a noun) without limiting that structure to a specific subset of structures ( e.g. , with an adjective), we will generally construe the claim to cover all known types of that structure that are supported by the patent disclosure. See, e.g. , Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co. , 133 F.3d 860, 865-66, 45 USPQ2d 1225, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (claim term "reciprocating" is given its ordinary meaning and not limited to mere linear reciprocation); Sjolund v. Musland , 847 F.2d 1573, 1581-82, 6 USPQ2d 2020, 2027 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (refusing to limit claim term "baffle" to only rigid baffles and term "panel" to only panels of lattice construction).
However, a common meaning, such as one expressed in a relevant dictionary, that flies in the face of the patent disclosure is undeserving of fealty. As one of our predecessor courts stated in Liebscher v. Boothroyd , 258 F.2d 948 (CCPA 1958):
Indiscriminate reliance on definitions found in dictionaries can often produce absurd results. . . . One need not arbitrarily pick and choose from the various accepted definitions of a word to decide which meaning was intended as the word is used in a given claim. The subject matter, the context, etc., will more often than not lead to the correct conclusion.
Id. at 951; see Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc. , 149 F.3d 1335, ___, 47 USPQ2d 1418, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Intel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n , 946 F.2d 821, 836, 20 USPQ2d 1161, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (affirming construction of "permanent" as a relative term in light of the patent disclosure); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc. , 776 F.2d 281, 298, 227 USPQ 657, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (claim limitation requiring that a process be carried out "under substantially anhydrous conditions with the removal of water above 100° C" covered only continuous removal of water, because the written description stated that failure to remove water continously would adversely affect the process). Thus, where there are several common meanings for a claim term, the patent disclosure serves to point away from the improper meanings and toward the proper meaning.
Ultimately, the interpretation to be given a term can only be determined and confirmed with a full understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to envelop with the claim. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. , 517 U.S. 370, 389 , 38 USPQ2d 1461, 1470 (1996). The construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent's description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction. See Young Dental , 112 F.3d at 1142, 42 USPQ2d at 1593 (affirming the district court's claim construction as "a more natural reading of the claim language" than the appellant's construction); cf. Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 401 ("Plainly, to make any canon take hold in a particular instance, the construction contended for must be sold, essentially, by means other than the use of the canon: The good sense of the situation and a simple construction of the available language to achieve that sense, by tenable means, out of the statutory language ."). A claim construction is persuasive, not because it follows a certain rule, but because it defines terms in the context of the whole patent.
【摘錄】Thus, a party wishing to use statements in the written description to confine or otherwise affect a patent's scope must, at the very least, point to a term or terms in the claim with which to draw in those statements.
參考：舊blog。
RENISHAW PLC v MARPOSS SOCIETA' PER AZIONI, ET AL.
要了解申請專利範圍的解譯這是一個很重要的判例，我覺得，它主要是探討是不是應將說明書中的限制條件，讀進申請專利範圍來限制權利範圍的情形。
Renishaw, of course, alludes to a familiar pair of claim construction canons: (a) one may not read a limitation into a claim from the written description, but (b) one may look to the written description to define a term already in a claim limitation, for a claim must be read in view of the specification of which it is a part. These two rules lay out the general relationship between the claims and the written description. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc. , 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 USPQ2d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. , 52 F.3d 967, 979-80, 34 USPQ2d 1321, 1329-30 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), aff'd , 517 U.S. 370, 38 USPQ2d 1461 (1996). As rules at the core of claim construction methodology, they provide guideposts for a spectrum of claim construction problems.
Although no canon of construction is absolute in its application, these two rules share two underlying propositions. First, it is manifest that a claim must explicitly recite a term in need of definition before a definition may enter the claim from the written description. This is so because the claims define the scope of the right to exclude; the claim construction inquiry, therefore, begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of the claim, see AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp. , 122 F.3d 1019, 1023, 43 USPQ2d 1545, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[T]he language of the claim frames and ultimately resolves all issues of claim interpretation."); Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp. , 55 F.3d 615, 619-20, 34 USPQ2d 1816, 1819 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The intrinsic evidence, and, in some cases, the extrinsic evidence, can shed light on the meaning of the terms recited in a claim, either by confirming the ordinary meaning of the claim terms or by providing special meaning for claim terms. See Vitronics , 90 F.3d at 1583, 39 USPQ2d at 1577. However, the resulting claim interpretation must, in the end, accord with the words chosen by the patentee to stake out the boundary of the claimed property. See Thermalloy, Inc. v. Aavid Eng'g, Inc. , 121 F.3d 691, 693, 43 USPQ2d 1846, 1848 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[T]hroughout the interpretation process, the focus remains on the meaning of claim language.").
Thus, a party wishing to use statements in the written description to confine or otherwise affect a patent's scope must, at the very least, point to a term or terms in the claim with which to draw in those statements. Without any claim term that is susceptible of clarification by the written description, there is no legitimate way to narrow the property right. The Supreme Court has clearly stated the rationale for this requirement:
[W]e know of no principle of law which would authorize us to read into a claim an element which is not present, for the purpose of making out a case of novelty or infringement. The difficulty is that if we once begin to include elements not mentioned in the claim in order to limit such claim . . ., we should never know where to stop.
McCarty v. Lehigh Valley R.R. , 160 U.S. 110, 116 (1895). If we need not rely on a limitation to interpret what the patentee meant by a particular term or phrase in a claim, that limitation is "extraneous" and cannot constrain the claim. See Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc. , 9 F.3d 948, 950, 28 USPQ2d 1936, 1938 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("It is improper for a court to add 'extraneous' limitations to a claim, that is, limitations added wholly apart from any need to interpret what the patentee meant by particular words or phrases in the claim." (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. , 849 F.2d 1430, 1433, 7 USPQ2d 1129, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp. , 845 F.2d 981, 987, 6 USPQ2d 1601, 1605 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Where a specification does not require a limitation, that limitation should not be read from the specification into the claims." (citing Lemelson v. United States , 752 F.2d 1538, 1551- 52, 224 USPQ 526, 534 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); cf. Constant v. Advanced Micro- Devices, Inc. , 848 F.2d 1560, 1571, 7 USPQ2d 1057, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that the written description provided "no evidence to indicate that [] limitations must be imported into the claims to give meaning to disputed terms").
The other clear point provided by these two canons covers the situation in which a patent applicant has elected to be a lexicographer by providing an explicit definition in the specification for a claim term. In such a case, the definition selected by the patent applicant controls. The patentee's lexicography must, of course, appear "with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision" before it can affect the claim. In re Paulsen , 30 F.3d 1475, 1480, 31 USPQ2d 1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc. , 952 F.2d 1384, 1388, 21 USPQ2d 1383, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1992). If the patentee provides such a clear definition, the two canons require reference to the written description, because only there is the claim term defined as it is used by the patentee. The law provides a patentee with this opportunity because the public may not be schooled in the terminology of the technical art or there may not be an extant term of singular meaning for the structure or concept that is being claimed. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp. , 733 F.2d 881, 889, 221 USPQ 1025, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Absent a special and particular definition created by the patent applicant, terms in a claim are to be given their ordinary and accustomed meaning. See York Prods., Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Ctr. , 99 F.3d 1568, 1572, 40 USPQ2d 1619, 1622 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Without an express intent to impart a novel meaning to claim terms, an inventor's claim terms take on their ordinary meaning."); Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., Inc. , 15 F.3d 1573, 1577, 27 USPQ2d 1836, 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Thus, when a claim term is expressed in general descriptive words, we will not ordinarily limit the term to a numerical range that may appear in the written description or in other claims. See Modine Mfg. , 75 F.3d at 1551, 37 USPQ2d at 1612. Nor may we, in the broader situation, add a narrowing modifier before an otherwise general term that stands unmodified in a claim. See, e.g. , Bell Communications , 55 F.3d at 621-22, 34 USPQ2d at 1821 (faulting the district court for interpreting claim term "associating" to cover only explicit, and not implicit, association); Specialty Composites , 845 F.2d at 986-87, 6 USPQ2d at 1604 (refusing to limit the recited claim term "plasticizer" to external plasticizers where skilled artisans used the term broadly). For example, if an apparatus claim recites a general structure ( e.g. , a noun) without limiting that structure to a specific subset of structures ( e.g. , with an adjective), we will generally construe the claim to cover all known types of that structure that are supported by the patent disclosure. See, e.g. , Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co. , 133 F.3d 860, 865-66, 45 USPQ2d 1225, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (claim term "reciprocating" is given its ordinary meaning and not limited to mere linear reciprocation); Sjolund v. Musland , 847 F.2d 1573, 1581-82, 6 USPQ2d 2020, 2027 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (refusing to limit claim term "baffle" to only rigid baffles and term "panel" to only panels of lattice construction).
However, a common meaning, such as one expressed in a relevant dictionary, that flies in the face of the patent disclosure is undeserving of fealty. As one of our predecessor courts stated in Liebscher v. Boothroyd , 258 F.2d 948 (CCPA 1958):
Indiscriminate reliance on definitions found in dictionaries can often produce absurd results. . . . One need not arbitrarily pick and choose from the various accepted definitions of a word to decide which meaning was intended as the word is used in a given claim. The subject matter, the context, etc., will more often than not lead to the correct conclusion.
Id. at 951; see Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc. , 149 F.3d 1335, ___, 47 USPQ2d 1418, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Intel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n , 946 F.2d 821, 836, 20 USPQ2d 1161, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (affirming construction of "permanent" as a relative term in light of the patent disclosure); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc. , 776 F.2d 281, 298, 227 USPQ 657, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (claim limitation requiring that a process be carried out "under substantially anhydrous conditions with the removal of water above 100° C" covered only continuous removal of water, because the written description stated that failure to remove water continously would adversely affect the process). Thus, where there are several common meanings for a claim term, the patent disclosure serves to point away from the improper meanings and toward the proper meaning.
Ultimately, the interpretation to be given a term can only be determined and confirmed with a full understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to envelop with the claim. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. , 517 U.S. 370, 389 , 38 USPQ2d 1461, 1470 (1996). The construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent's description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction. See Young Dental , 112 F.3d at 1142, 42 USPQ2d at 1593 (affirming the district court's claim construction as "a more natural reading of the claim language" than the appellant's construction); cf. Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 401 ("Plainly, to make any canon take hold in a particular instance, the construction contended for must be sold, essentially, by means other than the use of the canon: The good sense of the situation and a simple construction of the available language to achieve that sense, by tenable means, out of the statutory language ."). A claim construction is persuasive, not because it follows a certain rule, but because it defines terms in the context of the whole patent.
【摘錄】Thus, a party wishing to use statements in the written description to confine or otherwise affect a patent's scope must, at the very least, point to a term or terms in the claim with which to draw in those statements.
翻譯一：當事人想要用書面記載中的陳述，來限制申請專利範圍；或者不然，而是想要用來影響申請專利範圍，則必須至少指出申請專利範圍中的用語；以及於該些陳述中使用該些用語來進行描述。
翻譯二：當事人想要用書面記載中的陳述，來限制申請專利範圍；或者不然，而是想要用來影響申請專利範圍，則必須至少指出申請專利範圍中的用語；以及導出其定義的說明間的關係。
參考：舊blog。
【摘譯】說明書中的限制條件是否應讀進申請專利範圍
【摘譯】說明書中的限制條件是否應讀進申請專利範圍
RENISHAW PLC v MARPOSS SOCIETA' PER AZIONI, ET AL.
一個很難的句子，看了好久還是看不出所以然，若有知道粗體字真正意思的網友，麻煩指教，謝謝，會翻譯出來是參考一個日文句子的翻譯，說真的這一句我真的完全看不懂。
Thus, a party wishing to use statements in the written description to confine or otherwise affect a patent's scope must, at the very least, point to a term or terms in the claim with which to draw in those statements.
當事人想要用書面記載中的陳述，來限制申請專利範圍；或者不然，而是想要用來影響申請專利範圍，則必須至少指出：申請專利範圍中的用語、及導出其定義的說明，此兩者間的關係。
PS：這是一個很重要的判例，我覺得。主要是探討是不是應將說明書中的限制條件，讀進申請專利範圍來限制權利範圍的情形。
其他參考連結。
【2011年11月27日更新】
關於「draw」一詞
Clemens Alexandrinus used the term to draw to Christianity philosophers who aspired after virtue. （來源）
With these simple steps students can draw the letters of their name, or can be assigned a mathematical term to draw themselves.（來源）
「with」，它是“及”“和”等意思。 “a term or terms in the claim” with（“及”） which （指term）to draw（繪製,描寫） in those statements. 原英文應可重新翻譯成如下：
當事人想要用書面記載中的陳述來限制申請專利範圍；或者不然而是想要用來影響申請專利範圍，則至少必須指出：申請專利範圍中的“用語“及“它於該些陳述中所描述的意思“。
RENISHAW PLC v MARPOSS SOCIETA' PER AZIONI, ET AL.
一個很難的句子，看了好久還是看不出所以然，若有知道粗體字真正意思的網友，麻煩指教，謝謝，會翻譯出來是參考一個日文句子的翻譯，說真的這一句我真的完全看不懂。
Thus, a party wishing to use statements in the written description to confine or otherwise affect a patent's scope must, at the very least, point to a term or terms in the claim with which to draw in those statements.
當事人想要用書面記載中的陳述，來限制申請專利範圍；或者不然，而是想要用來影響申請專利範圍，則必須至少指出：申請專利範圍中的用語、及導出其定義的說明，此兩者間的關係。
PS：這是一個很重要的判例，我覺得。主要是探討是不是應將說明書中的限制條件，讀進申請專利範圍來限制權利範圍的情形。
其他參考連結。
【2011年11月27日更新】
關於「draw」一詞
Clemens Alexandrinus used the term to draw to Christianity philosophers who aspired after virtue. （來源）
With these simple steps students can draw the letters of their name, or can be assigned a mathematical term to draw themselves.（來源）
「with」，它是“及”“和”等意思。 “a term or terms in the claim” with（“及”） which （指term）to draw（繪製,描寫） in those statements. 原英文應可重新翻譯成如下：
當事人想要用書面記載中的陳述來限制申請專利範圍；或者不然而是想要用來影響申請專利範圍，則至少必須指出：申請專利範圍中的“用語“及“它於該些陳述中所描述的意思“。
2/06/2006
【Claim解釋】summary of the invention對Claim Construction的影響
【Claim解釋】summary of the invention對Claim Construction的影響
相較於說明書的其他部分，Summary of the invention對Claim Construction的影響較大。請參考：
C.R. Bard, et al. v. United States Surgical Corp.
Statements that describe the invention as a whole, rather than statements that describe only preferred embodiments, are more likely to support a limiting definition of a claim term. See Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (relying on “global comments made to distinguish the applicants’ ‘claimed invention’ from the prior art” during the prosecution of the patent in construing a claim term).
相較於僅描述較佳實施例的陳述，描述發明之整體的陳述，較有機會支持請求項用語的限制性定義。
Statements that describe the invention as a whole are more likely to be found in certain sections of the specification, such as the Summary of the Invention. See Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir.) (“Those statements, some of which are found in the ‘Summary of the Invention’ portion of the specification, are not limited to describing a preferred embodiment, but more broadly describe the overall inventions of all three patents.”)
描述發明之整體的陳述，較有可能於說明書的某些段落找到，例如於Summary of the Invention。
PS：以前在此blog也曾寫過這個主題，只是忘了在哪了一時之間找不到，不過有找到留在哈金的記錄。
PPS：怎麼翻譯翻不好，還沒找到自己翻判例的style。
相較於說明書的其他部分，Summary of the invention對Claim Construction的影響較大。請參考：
C.R. Bard, et al. v. United States Surgical Corp.
Statements that describe the invention as a whole, rather than statements that describe only preferred embodiments, are more likely to support a limiting definition of a claim term. See Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (relying on “global comments made to distinguish the applicants’ ‘claimed invention’ from the prior art” during the prosecution of the patent in construing a claim term).
相較於僅描述較佳實施例的陳述，描述發明之整體的陳述，較有機會支持請求項用語的限制性定義。
Statements that describe the invention as a whole are more likely to be found in certain sections of the specification, such as the Summary of the Invention. See Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir.) (“Those statements, some of which are found in the ‘Summary of the Invention’ portion of the specification, are not limited to describing a preferred embodiment, but more broadly describe the overall inventions of all three patents.”)
描述發明之整體的陳述，較有可能於說明書的某些段落找到，例如於Summary of the Invention。
PS：以前在此blog也曾寫過這個主題，只是忘了在哪了一時之間找不到，不過有找到留在哈金的記錄。
PPS：怎麼翻譯翻不好，還沒找到自己翻判例的style。
【Link】中文智權的blog
【Link】中文智權的blog。
將不定期更新此blog，收集所有的中文blog。
IP blogger
Patent Q & A
Duncan的專利自學筆記
不可不知
PS：希望能夠有愈來愈多的專利工程師加入寫blog的行列，一人寫一點點，累積正體中文的專利知識。如此，以後的人希望搜尋某項問題的解答時，就可以較輕易地找到自己要的答案在哪。
將不定期更新此blog，收集所有的中文blog。
IP blogger
Patent Q & A
Duncan的專利自學筆記
不可不知
PS：希望能夠有愈來愈多的專利工程師加入寫blog的行列，一人寫一點點，累積正體中文的專利知識。如此，以後的人希望搜尋某項問題的解答時，就可以較輕易地找到自己要的答案在哪。
訂閱：
文章 (Atom)